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 Working from a sample of all consumer class actions filed 
in the Northern District of Illinois during 2010–2012 
(totaling 510), this Article reports and analyzes data on class 
actions under four federal consumer protection statutes, the 
Electronic Funds Transfer Act (“EFTA”), the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (“FCRA”), the Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act (“FDCPA”), and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 
(“TCPA”). Even assuming that the TCPA cases alleged actual 
harm to the named plaintiff, over half the cases in the sample 
sought statutory damages without an allegation of harm to 
the plaintiff. Especially in large class actions, only 10% to 
15% of the class received compensation, and the aggregate 
compensation paid to the class is far less than the stated or 
nominal class settlement fund amount. Because courts award 
attorneys’ fees based on the nominal settlement amount, 
attorneys’ fees are a very large fraction of the amount paid to 
the class, and for some case types attorneys’ fees average 
300% to 400% of the amount paid to the class. With low class 
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compensation rates and attorneys’ fees to class counsel that 
often dwarf total class compensation, such class actions are 
highly inefficient means of awarding compensation to 
consumers. As the actual harm in such cases is, at best, 
small, consumers would likely have little ex-ante demand for 
insurance against such harm. Because statutory damages are 
far greater than the actual harm and relatively uniform and 
independent of actual harm, the system likely leads to a 
misallocation of efforts of class counsel toward such high 
statutory damage cases and away from cases with bigger 
harm but smaller statutory damages. In Spokeo, Inc. v. 
Robins, 578 U.S. __ (2016), the Supreme Court recently 
articulated a test for standing in actions brought under 
precisely the sort of no-harm, statutory damage provisions 
studied here. This Article concludes by evaluating possible 
solutions to socially wasteful no-harm causes of action under 
federal consumer protection statutes. One possibility is that 
under Spokeo, courts could screen true no-harm cases from 
the costly class-action process. Another is that through better 
monitoring of class settlement terms, district courts could 
lower the costs of class actions and restore balance between 
costs and benefits. The final reform possibility analyzed in 
this Article is Congressional amendment of no-harm statutory 
damage provisions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Suppose someone proposed a hypothetical system of 
compensatory wealth redistribution to consumers where the 
fees paid to the intermediaries accomplishing the 
distribution often dwarf the amount paid to consumers. 
Suppose that in this same system, the redistribution is so 
random that only a small fraction of consumers ever receive 
any payments at all. Suppose that this same person proposed 
a hypothetical system of deterrence in which the conduct 
being deterred with civil damages more often than not 
causes no harm to anyone. And now suppose, finally, that 
someone proposed to combine all these systems into a single 
complex and exorbitantly expensive institution.  
One might well suppose that no rational person would 
actually support the creation of this system. And yet—based 
on data my research assistants and I have collected on all 
consumer class actions filed in the Northern District of 
Illinois from 2010 through 2012 (the “Illinois Data”)—class-
action lawsuits under federal consumer protection statutes 
constitute precisely such a system.  
This sample of consumer class actions is the largest yet 
studied whose results can be subject to replication.1 In brief 
summary, this Article’s empirical findings show that in at 
least half of the class actions in our sample, the plaintiffs 
 
1 Our data on case filings, coding, and class settlements for the 
statutes studied here can be accessed at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.18130/V3/WR4RF9. The Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau’s dataset on class actions, discussed infra, is not and 
likely will not be publicly available.  
JOHNSTON – FINAL  
No. 1:1] HIGH COST, LITTLE COMPENSATION 5 
rely on statutory provisions that award statutory damages 
with no need for the plaintiffs to even allege that they were 
harmed. With or without harm allegations, over 80% of 
filings end in settlement. Individual settlement—where the 
named plaintiff settles and dismisses the individual action 
with prejudice—occurs in over 50% of cases. By comparison, 
class settlement rates range from 20% to almost 40% and 
generally compensate only a small fraction of the class. 
Compensation rates—the fraction of class members who 
actually receive compensation—vary tremendously across 
case types even for cases brought under the same statute. 
However, the biggest class actions seeking statutory 
damages with no allegation of injury to the plaintiff have 
compensation rates of 10% to 15%. Only in a very small 
number of class-action settlements do a majority of class 
members receive compensation.  
Our research shows that the cost of using the consumer 
class-action procedural device to compensate such a small 
fraction of consumer class members outweighs the aggregate 
amount delivered as compensation to consumers. Because 
few class members fill out valid claim forms, the aggregate 
amount that class members typically receive comprises a 
small fraction of the nominal or stated settlement amount. 
Since courts base attorneys’ fees on the nominal or stated 
settlement amount and not the actual money paid to class 
members, attorneys’ fees are a very large fraction of the 
actual class recovery. As a result, attorneys’ fees often equal 
300%–400% of the actual aggregate class recovery. Such 
disproportionate attorneys’ fee awards mostly arise in 
settlements that award a very small fraction of consumers 
any compensation and where the harm to consumers is very 
small or even arguably nonexistent.  
Thus, the 2010–2012 Illinois Data depicts class-action 
settlements under federal consumer protection statutes as a 
mechanism of compensation whose cost far exceeds actual 
class recovery and which awards recovery only to a small 
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fraction of class members.2 Moreover, the Illinois Data shows 
a remarkable frequency of class-action settlements where the 
wrongful conduct was a failure to follow notice and 
disclosure formalities—as under the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act (“FDCPA”) or the Electronic Funds Transfer 
Act (“EFTA”)—or a harmless clerical error—as in the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) cases, where a merchant 
printed a credit card receipt containing the credit card’s full 
expiration date. Most defendants who settle such cases are 
small or medium sized firms who have clearly violated a 
statutory provision of whose existence they may well have 
been completely unaware.   
 The empirical findings about class-action settlements in 
this Article illuminate a longstanding and increasingly 
important debate about the performance of the consumer 
class action. Few civil justice institutions have been subject 
to as much praise and criticism as the consumer class action. 
To supporters, the consumer class action is essential to the 
vindication of consumers’ rights in cases involving 
widespread harms that may be large in the aggregate but 
which are too small individually to be viable as individual 
lawsuits. Arguing that such small dollar claims represent 
“most” consumer claims, Adam Levitin argues that 
preventing such class actions “is a license for unscrupulous 
businesses to steal from their consumers.”3 Without the class 
litigation device, he argues, court opinions that produce legal 
precedents would not be written, leaving both businesses 
and trial attorneys in the dark as to consumer legal rights.  
 
2 To be sure, some class-action settlements allege very concrete harm 
to consumers, such as where a debt collector harassed a debtor in violation 
of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) or where a 
telemarketer made repeated unconsented autodialed phone calls to the 
plaintiff’s cellphone in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 
(“TCPA”). 
3 Adam J. Levitin, Mandatory Arbitration Offers Bargain-Basement 
Justice, AMERICAN BANKER (May 13, 2014), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/mandatory-arbitration-offers-
bargain-basement-justice-1067419-1.html [https://perma.cc/8CXR-47DG].  
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Critics question these supposed merits of class actions. 
For example, George Priest argues that class actions 
threaten firms with massive discovery costs and induce them 
to settle claims for huge amounts of money “where there 
appears to be no substantive basis for defendant liability.”4 
Martin Redish argues that, as in many class-action 
settlements the actual class members receive hardly any 
true compensation and attorneys’ fees dwarf aggregate class 
compensation, class actions represent a “wholly improper 
and unacceptable departure from the fundamental precepts 
of American democracy.”5  
The findings here confirm the view that class-action 
settlements are more effective in transferring money from 
the defendant to class counsel than in compensating class 
members. They show that the cost of awarding compensation 
via the class-action mechanism often dwarfs the amount 
actually paid in aggregate to class members and that a small 
fraction of class members receives any compensation at all. 
Judged solely as an instrument for compensating widespread 
but small harms, the consumer class actions reported on 
below are ineffective and exceedingly costly.  
In response to these findings, it may be argued that even 
if they do not award compensation to very many class 
members, class-action settlements nonetheless may 
effectively deter legal wrongdoing by defendants. The 
findings here suggest that for the statutes studied, class-
action settlements may be at best problematic on deterrence 
grounds. Perhaps our most striking finding is the sheer 
number of consumer class-action filings and settlements 
 
4 George L. Priest, What We Know and What We Don’t Know About 
Modern Class Actions: A Review of the Eisenberg-Miller Study, 9 CIV. JUST. 
REP. 1, 4 (2005).  
5 See Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: 
Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. 
CHI. L.F. 71, 81 (2003). For a further elaboration of the view that 
contemporary class actions lack both democratic and constitutional 
legitimacy, see Martin H. Redish, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT (2009).  
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under statutes awarding statutory damages (up to $1000) for 
easy-to-prove violations of statutory disclosure and notice 
formalities. Class-action settlements are much more likely in 
cases where the harm to consumers seems unclear or non-
existent—as where an expiration date is printed on a credit 
card receipt—than in cases where the harm seems greater—
as where debt collectors harass a debtor. It might well be a 
surprise to many members of Congress that when they voted 
for a statute giving consumers a right to statutory damages 
with no need to even allege harm, they created an 
enormously powerful incentive for class counsel to bring 
class actions where statutory damages may greatly exceed 
actual harm and where the defendant is typically a small 
firm that may have been unaware of the formalities required 
by statute.     
Over the past several years, class-action settlements 
under no-harm consumer-protection statutory provisions 
have been the focus of actions by both Congress and the 
courts. Both houses of Congress have recently passed 
legislation requiring class members to have sustained an 
actual injury of the same sort alleged by the named 
plaintiff.6 During its 2015–2016 term, the United States 
Supreme Court heard two cases—Campbell-Ewald Co. v. 
Gomez7 and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins8—arising under two of the 
federal consumer protection statutes discussed below.9 
Campbell-Ewald involved the procedural question of 
whether a class defendant can effectively moot a class action 
by offering to pay full judgment to the named plaintiff before 
that plaintiff moves to certify the class.10 As discussed below, 
defendants have used this tactic in one type of case included 
 
6 Fairness in Class Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim 
Transparency Act of 2016, H.R. 1927, 114th Cong. (2016).  
7 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016).  
8 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).  
9 Campbell-Ewald was a case under the TCPA, discussed infra at 
notes 140–50, while Spokeo was a case under the FCRA, discussed infra at 
notes 104–28.   
10 136 S. Ct. at 666. 
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in the Illinois Data, one where the plaintiff alleges that an 
ATM provider violated the EFTA by failing to have a notice 
of fees “on or at” the ATM machine.11 But this tactic 
disappeared from use once class counsel began avoiding the 
problem by moving quickly to certify the class or simply 
telling the court that they would soon do so.12  
If the Illinois Data reveals that the Campbell-Ewald offer 
of judgment/mootness issue13 may be of little practical 
significance, the same is not true of the issue in Spokeo. 
Plaintiffs in Spokeo sought statutory damages of $100 to 
$1000 under the FCRA against a “people search engine” 
website that allegedly misstated information about the 
plaintiffs’ age, marital status, education, and professional 
experience.14 The FCRA permits statutory damages without 
requiring proof of harm for the publication of a false report.15 
The defendant in Spokeo argued that such no-harm class 
actions cannot be brought unless the plaintiff establishes 
Constitutional Article III standing by alleging that she 
suffered an actual injury.16 The Court held that the alleged 
injury must be both “particularized” and “concrete” to satisfy 
Article III standing requirements but that such a concrete 
injury could include “intangible” harm.17 Our empirical 
findings show that class actions under no-harm provisions—
such as that in Spokeo—make up about half of all filings 
under federal consumer protection statutes and thus show 
the significance of the standing decision in Spokeo. After 
presenting the evidence, this Article evaluates the possibility 
 
11 See infra notes 73–100 and accompanying text.  
12 For an example of this tactic, see Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification, Core v. Bradley Wings, No. 10-cv-
05900 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2010), ECF No. 8, where the plaintiff filed a 
motion to certify the class, with accompanying supporting memorandum, 
four days after filing the complaint. 
13 See Campbell-Ewald, 136 S. Ct. at 670–72.  
14 Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1545.  
15 See id.  
16 Reply Brief for Petitioner at 15–16, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. 
Ct. 1540 (2016) (No. 13-1339), 2015 WL 5731782.  
17 See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548.  
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that courts might use Spokeo’s standing test to improve the 
performance of class actions under federal consumer 
protection statutes such as the FCRA.  
The empirical findings in this Article also bear on the 
major market alternative to class-action litigation: 
mandatory consumer arbitration. For years, state courts and 
consumer advocates have decried clauses in consumer 
contracts requiring consumers to arbitrate disputes and 
prohibiting consumers from bringing (or joining) class 
actions. State courts and consumer advocates have argued 
that arbitration cannot adequately substitute the class 
action as an instrument of compensation and deterrence. For 
example, in Discover Bank v. Superior Court, the California 
Supreme Court reasoned that because “damages in consumer 
cases are often small,” “the class action is often the only 
effective way” to deter companies from wrongfully extracting 
small amounts from consumers.18  
In recent years, the Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled 
that federal law preempts state court holdings that class-
action waivers in consumer contracts are against public 
policy. In AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, the Court held that 
by forbidding arbitration clauses that preclude class-wide 
civil and arbitral relief, California’s Discover Bank approach 
runs afoul of and is preempted by the Federal Arbitration 
Act.19 Two years after Concepcion, the Court enforced a 
clause mandating arbitration and waiving class-wide relief 
for claims alleging violations of federal antitrust law in 
American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant (“Amex II”).20 
However, in its March 2015 Arbitration Study (“2015 
Arbitration Study”), the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (“CFPB”) presented data that some interpreted as 
showing that class actions are much more effective than 
arbitration at compensating injured consumers and 
deterring misconduct by consumer financial products and 
 
18 Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108–09 (Cal. 
2005).  
19 563 U.S. 333, 346–52 (2011). 
20 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).  
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services providers.21 With the 2015 Arbitration Study as its 
primary supporting evidence, in May 2016, the CFPB issued 
a proposed rule banning arbitration clauses in consumer 
financial contracts if they prohibit the consumer from filing 
or participating in a class action.22 This Article’s findings on 
the performance of one type of consumer class action are 
thus relevant to the fate of this proposed rule and to the 
continuing debate over mandatory arbitration in consumer 
contracts. 
The next section of this Article describes the method of 
data collection and contextualizes the filings studied in 
detail in this Article within the larger, full sample of 
consumer class actions that we gathered from the Northern 
District of Illinois. It then reports on class-action outcomes 
under different statutes and causes of action within statutes. 
The final two sections outline the implications of the 
empirical findings for the social utility of consumer class 
actions and suggest some possible policy responses to the 
problems with consumer class actions identified in our data. 
 
II. THE NORTHERN DISTRICT, ILLINOIS 
EVIDENCE 
A. Federal Statutory Consumer Class-Action Case 
Types and Outcomes 
This section clarifies how our sample of consumer class 
actions was constructed and shows the overall distribution of 
case types—those brought under both federal and state 
law—within the sample. This section then shows the 
 
21 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD–FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND 
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(A) 
(2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-
report-to-congress-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/VX3F-58YX] [hereinafter 
2015 ARBITRATION STUDY]. 
22 Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,830 (proposed May 24, 
2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1040).  
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distribution of outcomes for the federal statutory case types 
discussed in more detail later in the Article. 
 
1. The Data Underlying This Study 
Our class-action sample studied was drawn from cases 
filed in the Northern District of Illinois between January 1, 
2010 and December 31, 2012. The Northern District was 
chosen because in prior work, Fitzpatrick observed that the 
Northern District had a large number of class action 
settlements relative to the size of its civil docket.23 All data 
come from the federal court PACER electronic database of 
docket sheets. Appendix 2 describes the search terms used in 
identifying consumer class actions in the Illinois Data. The 
search criteria defined “consumer class actions” to exclude 
securities class actions and antitrust class actions. On the 
other hand, the data includes any other type of class action 
brought on behalf of consumers under both federal and state 
law, including the common law. The federal consumer 
protection laws define “consumer” more broadly than does 
the dictionary. Under the FCRA, an employment background 
check is a “consumer report.”24 For this reason, the data 
includes FCRA cases involving employment background 
checks in the sample. Similarly, doctors and dentists with 
small offices often receive unauthorized telemarketing faxes, 
and such doctors and dentists are “consumers” protected 
under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act’s (“TCPA”) 
 
23 Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action 
Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 811, 823 
(2010). 
24 See 15 USC § 1681a(d)(1) (defining a “consumer report” as “any 
written, oral, or other communication of any information by a consumer 
reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit 
standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal 
characteristics, or mode of living”). Section 1681a(d)(1) explicitly states 
that if “used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the 
purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibility for 
. . . employment purposes” then the report is a statutory consumer report. 
Id. 
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prohibition on sending such unauthorized communications.25 
Thus, the data set includes cases where defendants allegedly 
sent unauthorized faxes to doctors and dentists. 
Information regarding the type and resolution of 
consumer class actions is derived from docket sheets and the 
documents to which such sheets provide links. The type of 
class action—both legally and factually—as well as amount 
claimed were identified by review of each complaint. 
Identification of the resolution of each case was then 
conducted by examination of the relevant docket entries.26 
Much of this process was straightforward. If, for example, a 
case ended when the court granted the defendant’s summary 
judgment motion, that would be evident from the docket 
sheet entry and there would typically be an opinion written 
to justify the summary judgment order. 
Class-action settlements must be approved by the court 
as fair, and class counsel must submit memoranda in 
support of both preliminary and final approval of the class-
action settlement. Class counsel also must submit 
memoranda in support of attorneys’ fees awards. The 
exhibits attached to these memoranda virtually always 
include affidavits from the settlement administration 
company reporting the number of class members that it 
notified, the number of valid claims, and similar information. 
If the exhibits do not contain such information, the next step 
is to examine the memoranda written to justify an award of 
attorneys’ fees. These memoranda typically include the 
number of hours spent on the case, the proportional 
relationship between attorneys’ fees and the nominal 
 
25 In the sample studied here, there were many such doctor’s and 
dentist office junk fax TCPA cases.  For some examples, see Dr. G. Neil 
Garrett, DDS v. Sharps Compliance, No. 10-cv-04030 (N.D. Ill. 2010); 
Chicago Chiropractic & Sports Injury Center, LTD v. Great Plains 
Laboratory, Inc., et al., No. 10-cv-06151 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Florence Mussat 
MD SC v. Global Healthcare Resource, Inc. dba Physician Billing Services, 
Inc., No. 11-cv-07035 (N.D. Ill. 2011).   
26 In some filings under multiple statutes, the entire history of the 
case, as drawn from docket sheets, was considered when categorizing the 
case under the statute under which the action actually proceeded. 
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settlement amount typical of similar cases in the Northern 
District of Illinois and elsewhere around the country, and 
other information detailing how the settlement funds will be 
distributed. These memoranda and their supporting exhibits 
are the primary source of information about class-action 
settlements. 
Rarely did district courts write opinions explaining why 
they found a class settlement to be fair. For a small number 
of class-action settlements, no formal memoranda from 
counsel justify the settlement’s fairness. Instead, the dockets 
included only an order from the court approving the 
settlement. It is noteworthy that in the entire sample of 
about 500 consumer class-action filings, not a single district 
court opinion ultimately declined to approve a class-action 
settlement. 
Individual settlements are more difficult to identify. In 
some dockets, entries indicate that the parties had discussed 
settlement and/or reached an individual settlement. In such 
instances, the case was resolved with the entry of an order 
dismissing the individual claim with prejudice and the class 
claims without prejudice. In a minority of cases, a final order 
was stipulated to and entered dismissing the individual 
claim with prejudice and the class claim without prejudice, 
but no prior entries state that the case had settled 
individually. We coded such outcomes as an “individual 
settlement.” 
 
2. Relationship to Prior Empirical Studies of 
Consumer Class Actions 
Few other studies have considered the performance of 
consumer class actions as an instrument of compensation or 
deterrence. Indeed, the only other systematic study of class 
actions drawn from a search of case filings (as opposed to 
reported opinions and other selective reports) appeared in 
the 2015 Arbitration Study.27 There, the CFPB attempted to 
 
27 See 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 21. 
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identify all consumer class actions filed in federal court (and 
for selected state courts) during 2010–2012 that involved one 
of six product categories that the CFPB categorized as a 
“financial product.” The CFPB looked at all federal courts, 
whereas this study is based on a sample from only the 
Northern District of Illinois. The CFPB looked at the same 
time period examined here, and its methodology was similar 
to that employed here, in that the CFPB searched complaints 
and other docket items that are available electronically.28 
However, the CFPB sought to find all federal filings 
involving one of its six consumer financial product 
categories, whether brought as an individual action or a 
class action.29 Here, the objective is to identify all consumer 
class actions. As the CFPB’s study is very large and employs 
a similar search methodology to that used here, this Article 
often compares the CFPB’s findings to the findings reported 
below.30 
The only other study of consumer class actions that 
gathered data directly from docket sheets is by Fitzpatrick 
and Gilbert.31 That study looked at only fifteen class-action 
settlements in class actions challenging bank overdraft on a 
variety of state law theories.32 One of the authors was 
coordinating lead class counsel in the consolidated litigation 
discussed by the study.33 Most importantly for present 
purposes, the overdraft fee class actions studied by 
Fitzpatrick and Gilbert were not brought under the federal 
consumer protection statutes studied here.  
 
28 In the LexisNexis Courtlink electronic database, which includes the 
docket entries found in PACER that were used in this paper. 
29 Section 6, in 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 21, at 11–15; 
Appendix L: Section 6, in 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 21.  
30 Appendix 2 includes other differences in search methodology 
between this study and the CFPB’s. 
31 Brian T. Fitzpatrick & Robert C. Gilbert, An Empirical Look at 
Compensation in Consumer Class Actions, N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 767, 779 
(2015). 
32 Id. at 779–80. 
33 Id. at 767.  
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A recent 2016 study by Joanna Shepherd closely relates 
to the present Article.34 Shepherd’s team used a variety of 
search criteria to identify 2,158 class-action settlements over 
the period 2005–2015 in cases involving no-injury 
allegations, where statutory damages provided the sole 
ground for relief.35 By looking at all consumer class actions,36 
the present study shows that such no-injury class-action 
settlements make up a very large fraction of all consumer 
class-action settlements under the federal statutes. This 
study includes the same types of settlements as Shepherd 
discussed, in addition to others. 
Moreover, this Article discusses how class-action 
outcomes and settlements vary across statutes and across 
case types under the same statute. The following analysis 
focuses on three aspects of such settlements: (1) the actual 
aggregate payout to the class; (2) how it compares to the 
nominal settlement amount and to attorneys’ fees; and (3) 
the actual fraction of the class that receives compensation 
(the compensation rate). Shepherd does not break out these 
variables by case type but reports only “percentage to class 
members” and other payouts across the four, primary no-
 
34 Joanna Shepherd, An Empirical Survey of No-Injury Class Actions 
(Emory University Legal Studies Research Paper No. 16-402, 2016), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2726905 
[https://perma.cc/7H9E-E3JF].  
35 Id. at 9.  
36 There seem to be differences in how Shepherd’s team identified and 
gathered information on class settlements. She reports that the team got 
data on class settlements from “final orders, settlement agreements, and 
various other court documents such as those approving settlements and 
attorneys’ fee awards.” Id. at 1. When reviewing PACER docket sheets 
during data collection for this Article, the research team discovered that 
information on key features of class settlements, such as attorneys’ fees 
and the actual compensation rate for the class, is generally not included in 
final orders or opinions (indeed there are few opinions approving class 
settlements, just uninformative orders). Such information is available in 
the memoranda and supporting exhibits that class counsel submit when 
they move to have the class settlement and attorney fee request approved. 
It is not clear whether Shepherd’s team accessed such memoranda and 
exhibits. 
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injury federal statutes (FDCPA, TCPA, FCRA, and EFTA).37 
For this reason, one cannot compare outcomes discussed in 
this Article with those that Shepherd reports.  
Authors of earlier empirical work on consumer class-
action settlements focused on much smaller and more 
selective samples than those discussed here. Fitzpatrick 
included consumer class-action settlements in a more 
general study of federal class-action settlements over the 
years 2006–2007.38 However, he identified cases with class-
action settlements from highly selective lists, such as 
published class-action reporters and district court opinions, 
only turning to electronic docket sheet data for class 
settlement details afterwards.39 Fitzpatrick focused on the 
determinants of attorneys’ fees in class-action settlements 
and the size of such fees relative to the class settlement.40 
Because Fitzpatrick found little variation in fees relative to 
settlements—with a ratio clustering around 25% to 30%—he 
did not obtain and analyze data on the aggregate payout to 
the class.41 That is, his work focused only on the nominal 
settlement amount, which is the amount stated in the 
settlement agreement and court order and which is almost 
always much greater than the actual payout to the class. 
The law firm of Mayer Brown LLP published a more 
thorough attempt to identify the actual aggregate payout to 
the class.42 However, that study looked at a very selective 
sample based on reports of class-action settlements and 
therefore is not comparable to the Illinois Data. As with the 
CFPB and Shepherd studies, this Article discusses the 
 
37 Id. at 16. 
38 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 23, at 816. 
39 Id. at 9–13. 
40 Id. at 14–22.  
41 Id. at 20–22.   
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differences between the findings in this earlier work and this 
Article’s findings. 
Before the electronic availability of full federal court 
docket sheets, as a practical matter empirical studies of 
class-action outcomes were impossible. For example, in a 
2008 study, Pace and Rubenstein attempted to determine the 
value class-action settlements actually have for the 
plaintiffs.43 Pace and Rubenstein reviewed the official case 
files in thirty-one federal class-action settlements and 
interviewed judges, lawyers, and settlement administrators 
involved with fifty-seven class-action resolutions.44 The 
authors found their task difficult, as just six of the thirty-one 
cases files contained information on either the number of 
claims paid or the total amount of compensation.45 Further, 
only fourteen out of 222 (6%) of the lawyers, judges, and 
claims administrators whom the authors contacted provided 
relevant information, covering only eleven out of fifty-seven 
cases.46 
Pace and Rubenstein say they learned “very little” from 
the six case files, concluding that only a small fraction of 
class members received compensation when not automatic.47 
The authors discovered that in the four cases with automatic 
distribution (mailing a check to a known class member), a 
high percentage of victims received compensation (ranging 
from 76% to 99% of the class).48 However, where plaintiffs 
had to complete a form to receive compensation, only 4% of 
the class in one case received a small recovery (of $30 per 
victim), and in another case only 20% received a much more 
 
43 Nicholas M. Pace & William B. Rubenstein, How Transparent Are 
Class Action Outcomes? Empirical Research on the Availability of Class 
Action Claims Data 1–4 (RAND Institute for Civil Justice, Working Paper 
No. 599, 2008).  
44 Id. at 3. 
45 Id. at 23.  
46 Id. at 31.  
47 Id. at 23. 
48 Id. 
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significant amount ($1000).49 Pace and Rubenstein noted 
that as they required class members to fill out a form to be 
eligible for compensation, the majority (13 out of 25) of the 
cases without meaningful information as to settlement 
distribution were similar to the settlement with a 4% 
compensation rate.50 
As for the nine class actions about which Pace and 
Rubenstein received claims distribution information from 
attorneys, judges, and claims administrators, three cases 
had distribution rates below 5%, four between 20%–40%, and 
two with rates above 50% (with a maximum of 82%).51 
Distribution rates were the lowest in the largest class 
actions, with hundreds of thousands or millions of class 
members, even when recovery amounts were as high as 
$1,500.52 
While not based on a large, representative sample of class 
actions, Pace and Rubenstein’s conclusion is consistent with 
other findings on class-action compensation rates. For 
example, in a study of insurance class actions, Pace et al. 
received survey responses from fifty-seven large insurance 
companies, who reported data on 748 distinct class actions, 
89% of which were filed in state court.53 In seven of twenty-
three cases with complete payout and attorney fee 
information, the median distribution rate to actual plaintiffs 
was 79%.54 However, in another quarter of cases, the 
distribution rate was 13%.55 In 3% of cases, the plaintiffs 
received only 4% of the net compensation fund.56 In ten cases 
where sources reported potential class size and the number 
of claims paid, 100% of the class members received some 
 
49 Id. at 24. 
50 Id. at 25. 
51 Id. at 32.  
52 See id. 
53 NICHOLAS M. PACE ET AL., INSURANCE CLASS ACTIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES, xvii–xviii (2007). 
54 Id. at xxiii.  
55 Id.  
56 Id.  
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compensation; however, in the worst case, only an estimated 
1% of class members received compensation.57 In the median 
case, just 15% of the potential class received any 
compensation.58 In another study, Hensler et al. reviewed 
ten class-action settlements in detail and found that 
compensation rates varied from 100% to less than 5%.59 As 
did Pace and Rubenstein, Hensler et al. concluded that 
plaintiffs tended to receive higher distribution rates in cases 
with automatic payout, while plaintiffs tended to receive 
lower distribution rates when class members actually had to 
fill out a form.60 Hensler et al.’s conclusion comports with 
Pace and Rubenstein’s findings. 
 
3. Class Actions Under Federal Consumer 
Protection Statutes Within the Universe of 
Consumer Class-Action Filings 
This Article analyzes case types comprising an important 
fraction of all consumer class-action filings in the Illinois 
Data. Figure 1 below shows the frequency distribution for 
the 506 class-action filings in the Illinois Data. As shown, 
plaintiffs made 131 filings under the FDCPA, 127 filings 
under the TCPA, fifty-three filings under the FCRA, and 
forty-three under the EFTA. Of the twenty cases brought 
under privacy protection statutes other than FCRA, twelve 
were brought under federal privacy protection statutes such 
as the Video Privacy Protection Act.61 
The 366 filings under federal consumer protection 
statutes comprise 72% of all filings in the sample. Filings 
under such federal consumer protection statutes made up 
 
57 Id.  
58 Id. 
59 DEBORAH HENSLER, ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING 
PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAINS 549 tbl. E.1 (Rand Inst. for Civil Justice) 
(2000) (compensation rates reported in the text here have been calculated 
from the data presented in Table E.1 in Hensler et al.). 
60 Id. at 459.  
61 See infra Figure 1.  
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71.7% of all filings in the CFPB’s much larger 2010–2012 
dataset discussed in its 2015 Arbitration Study.62 This 
indicates that in terms of the frequency of federal statutory 
causes of action, the case types found in the Illinois Data are 
likely typical of consumer filings in other federal courts. 
One difference between the case types indicated in Figure 
1 and the case types found in the 2015 Arbitration Study is 
the absence from Figure 1 of cases brought under the federal 
Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). The Illinois Data contained 
eleven cases in which the complaint included an alleged 
TILA violation. In three of those cases,63 the TILA allegation 
was secondary to an alleged violation of a different federal 
consumer protection statute, such as the FDCPA. In such 
instances, the case is coded as arising under the different 
statute. In another seven cases, the plaintiffs did not pursue 
the TILA allegation, as the case involved alleged wrongdoing 
in mortgage origination or servicing. These cases were 
resolved on state law grounds, and thus are coded under the 
mortgage-related categories.64 The plaintiffs actively pursued 
a TILA allegation in only one case.65 
Complaints also alleged violations of state consumer 
protection laws or wrongful behavior triggering common law 
 
62 See 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 21, at 21 fig.2. 
63 Greene v. Direct TV, No. 10-cv-00117 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (coded as 
TCPA); Wysocki v. City Nat’l Bank, No. 10-cv-03850 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (coded 
as FDCPA); and Velasquez v. THD At-Home Servs., No. 12-cv-03125 (N.D. 
Ill. 2012) (coded as FDCPA). 
64 Such cases are either in the “HAMP Mortgage Failure” or “Other 
Mortgage” categories and include Smith v. Residential Servs., No. 10-cv-
05440 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Boyden v. BMO Harris Bank, No. 11-cv-00061 (N.D. 
Ill. 2011); Kesten v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, No. 11-cv-06981 (N.D. Ill. 
2011); Sindler v. Saxon Mortgage, No. 12-cv-07224 (N.D. Ill 2012); and 
Walton v. Diamond, Urban Fin. Servs., No. 12-cv-044493 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 
Two such cases, Benn v. Surgery Grp., No. 10-cv-05922 (N.D. Ill 2010) and 
Battle v. Chi. Cycle, No. 10-cv-06983 (N.D. Ill. 2010), are in the “fees and 
charges” category. 
65 Swanson v. Argent, No. 10-cv-01039 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (alleging that 
defendant failed to notify plaintiffs of their right to rescind, as required by 
TILA). 
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liability.66 Figure 1 describes some state law case types, such 
as those involving products liability (defective products) 
claims and those alleging false and deceptive advertising. 
Other types require quick clarification. Those categorized as 
involving “fees and charges” challenge the imposition of such 
fees and charges in various consumer contracts on a variety 
of state common law and statutory theories. Home 
Affordable Mortgage Program (“HAMP”) mortgage 
modification failure cases arose from the federal HAMP and 
alleged that financial defendants were liable for failing to 
modify mortgages as promised pursuant to that program. 
“Other mortgage” claims include a congeries of alleged 
violations arising from mortgage origination and servicing. 
Usurious payday loan claims alleged precisely that. The final 
category of claims arose under European Union Regulation 
261.67 In that category of cases, plaintiffs alleged that 
various airline defendants failed to compensate passengers 
for international flight delay or cancellation. 
 
 
66 These state law consumer class actions will be discussed and 
analyzed in detail in a subsequent article. 
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FIGURE 1. NUMBER OF CONSUMER CLASS-ACTION FILINGS, 
N.D. ILL. 2010–2012, BY CASE TYPE 
 
4. Outcomes in Class Actions Under Federal 
Consumer Protection Statutes 
As this Article is the first in a series analyzing the 
Northern District of Illinois consumer class-action types 
depicted in Figure 1, it analyzes only class actions under 
federal consumer protection statutes. A brief description of 
these statutes follows, in order of frequency, from most 
common to least. 
The most frequently occurring federal consumer 
protection class actions are brought under the FDCPA. That 
statute68 imposes various formal requirements on debt 
collectors, such as registration and disclosure of identity as a 
debt collector. The FDCPA also contains substantive 
protections for consumer debtors. It bars a variety of abusive 
debt collector practices, such as dunning consumers on time-
 
68 See infra text accompanying notes 128–39. 
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barred debts without disclosure of that fact, making 
harassing phone calls (sometimes using auto-dial and pre-
recorded messages) attempting to collect debts, using false 
and misleading information about the balance of the debt, 
and attempting to embarrass debtors by calling third parties. 
Second, cases brought under the TCPA69 allege that the 
defendant sent unauthorized and unsolicited automated text 
messages, phone calls, or emails to the plaintiffs’ cell phones 
or sent one or more unauthorized faxes. Plaintiffs allege that 
defendants initiated contact with plaintiffs either as part of a 
debt collection process or as part of a telemarketing program. 
Third, cases brought under the EFTA allege that the 
defendant failed to post a physical notice of the fees charged 
for use of an automated teller machine (“ATM”). 
Finally, cases brought under the FCRA70 most commonly 
allege that the defendant printed out the expiration date of a 
credit card on a retail receipt, a violation of FCRA’s privacy 
protection provisions. FRCA cases also involve alleged 
violations in the use of an employment background check 
report (a consumer report under FCRA) and, less often, an 
allegation that information was disclosed in violation of the 
FCRA’s statutory privacy protections. 
Putting aside the category of “non-FCRA privacy,”71 by 
February 2016, most cases—338 out of 365 or 93%—filed 
under the four main federal consumer protection statutes 
(FDCPA, TCPA, FCRA, and EFTA) had terminated. The 
distribution of outcomes under these four, primary federal 
consumer protection statutes is depicted in Table 1 and 





69 See infra text accompanying notes 140–42. 
70 See infra text accompanying notes 104–27. 
71 As there were only 12 privacy violation cases arising under various 
federal privacy protection statutes, those cases will be discussed in a 
separate paper on consumer privacy class actions under both state and 
federal law. 
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TCPA 113 .28 .51 .15 .06 .00 
FCRA 51 .37 .50 .06 .06 .00 
FDCPA 122 .21 .70 .06 .02 .01 
EFTA 43 .19 .59 .00 .20 .02 
 
Table 1 shows substantial variation across case types in 
the relative frequency of each outcome. As explored in the 
substantive discussion below, this variation is largely due to 
differences in statutory causes of action. However, for the 
only three statutory claim types that still exist today,72 
between 87% and 93% of all claims are resolved in either an 
individual or class settlement. Such high settlement rates 
are indicative of civil litigation generally. However, in 
another respect, they seem very different. In only four cases 
did the plaintiff achieve a judgment in its favor (two TCPA 
cases, one FDCPA case, and one EFTA case). All of these 
cases were default judgments. In this sample, plaintiffs never 
actually had their substantive claim adjudicated on the 
merits by a judge or jury. Finally, defendant victories were 
judgments on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss or on motions for summary 
judgment. In roughly 370 resolved cases discussed in this 









72 See infra, Section II.B. for a discussion of Congress’ elimination of 
the ATM notice failures as a cause of action under the EFTA. 
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FIGURE 2. OUTCOME FREQUENCY ACROSS DIFFERENT 
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B. Lessons from an Extinct Cause of Action: ATM 
Notice Failures under the EFTA 
In an ATM notice failure case, the plaintiff alleges that 
an ATM provider failed to post a notice of the fees charged 
“on or at” an ATM as was then required by EFTA. As the 
CFPB explained in a 2013 rulemaking,73 Congress amended 
section 904(d)(3) of the EFTA in 1999 to require notices of 
the fee charged to the consumer digitally on the ATM screen 
and “on or at” the machine. The “on or at” notice “usually 
involved a sticker placed on the machine by the ATM 
operator.”74 Under EFTA section 916, failure to provide the 
required notice could trigger liability in an individual or 
class action for actual damages; costs and attorneys’ fees; 
and statutory damages between $100 and $1,000 per 
plaintiff without proof of harm.75 Under section 910(d), ATM 
operators could escape such liability only if they could show 
that the “on or at” ATM notice had been damaged or removed 
by a third party.76 
In December 2012, Congress voted to eliminate the ATM 
“on or at” notice requirement from the EFTA.77 As a result, 
cases alleging that the failure of an ATM to comply with this 
notice requirement violates the EFTA are now extinct. 
However, in several respects, these extinct ATM cases 
perfectly illustrate a class-action case type that still survives 
under many federal consumer protection statutes: a case 
where no class member has actually suffered any injury but 
which is nonetheless settled, where the nominal settlement 
is far less than the actual amount paid to class members, 
 
73 See Disclosures at Automated Teller Machines (Regulation E), 78 
Fed. Reg. 18,221 (Mar. 26, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1005). 
74 Id. at 18,221. 
75 However, class damages are capped at the lesser of 1% of the 
defendant’s net worth or $500,000. 15 U.S.C. § 1693m(a)(B) (2012). 
76 15 U.S.C. § 1693m(a-h) (2012).  
77 In Public Law 112–216, deleting the “on or at” requirement plus 
some other obsolete language from section 904(d)(3) of the EFTA. Act of 
Dec. 20, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-216, 126 Stat. 1590. 
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and where that amount—the actual compensation received 
by the class—is dwarfed by the attorneys’ fees received by 
class counsel. For this reason, ATM notice failure class-
action settlements are an interesting and important case 
study. 
Between 2010 and 2012, plaintiffs filed forty-three ATM 
notice failure class actions in the Northern District of 
Illinois. In each case, the complaint alleged that an ATM 
machine in metropolitan Chicago failed to have the required 
“on or at” notice on a date when the named plaintiff used the 
machine. Such complaints were supported by photos 
allegedly showing the state of the machine on the date it was 
used by the plaintiff. Each case invariably sought statutory 
damages of up to $1000 per class member, plus attorneys’ 
fees and costs. As shown in Table 2 below, the outcomes of 
such litigation quite clearly evolved over the sample period. 
However, 74% of the ATM notice failure cases ended in 
either a class or individual settlement. In this sense, the 
cases were very successful. 
 























2010 18 6, 33% 3, 18% 9, 50% 
2011 16 3, 19% 5, 31% 9, 56% 
2012 9 2, 22% 0, 0% 7, 78% 
 
Given that no court scrutiny is required for individual 
plaintiff settlements, the dockets generally do not contain 
details about their terms. The single exception is the docket 
entry for Stilz v. ATM National Solutions, LLC’s attorneys’ 
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fees.78 In that case, the court entered a default judgment 
order awarding the plaintiff statutory damages of $1000 and 
$10,905.50 in attorneys’ fees and costs to class counsel.79 
This ratio of attorneys’ fees and costs to plaintiff recovery of 
10:1 means that the attorneys’ fees are equal to 1000% of the 
relief obtained. 
As noted above, the requirement that judges approve 
class-action settlements as fair does generate information 
about class-action settlements. Appendix 1 details the class-
action settlements in ATM notice failure cases. To 
understand Appendix 1 and the subsequent analysis of class-
action settlements under the other federal consumer 
protection statutes found in the sample, one must 
understand a few basic features of class-action settlements. 
Class-action settlements generally have a stated or nominal 
settlement amount. In virtually all cases, that nominal 
amount caps the amount that the defendant pays out 
pursuant to the settlement. Such payouts go first as 
attorneys’ fees to class counsel and then as incentive awards 
to named plaintiffs and as fees to the settlement 
administrator (the company that sends out notices to the 
class of their rights under the settlement). Next, actual class 
members who qualify (typically by filling out a valid claim 
form) receive compensation. In some cases, a provision in the 
settlement is made for some portion of the remaining funds 
to be paid out as a cy pres award. In the Illinois Data, such 
cy pres awards always went to legal aid organizations of one 
sort or another. With rare exceptions (in so-called non-
reversionary settlement funds), after all these payouts are 
made, the defendant keeps whatever funds remain from the 
nominal settlement. Thus, for example, if the nominal 
settlement amount was $100,000 but only $50,000 was paid 
out to class counsel, named plaintiffs, the class, the 
settlement administrator, and the cy pres recipient, then the 
 
78 Stilz v. ATM Nat. Sols., No. 1:11-cv-05519 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 
79 See Order of May 14, 2012, Stilz v. ATM Nat’l Sols., No. 11-5519 
(N.D. Ill. 2012), ECF No. 22. 
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defendant would only pay out a total of $50,000, not the 
$100,000 nominal settlement amount. 
The existing empirical literature on class-action 
settlements does not share a common investigative goal; 
therefore, different studies report different class-action 
settlement measures. The most recent study, by Shepherd,80 
reports on how class settlement payouts are divided among 
the class, attorneys, settlement administrators, and cy pres 
awards to charities. Fitzpatrick’s 2010 paper is concerned 
primarily with discussing how attorneys’ fees as a fraction of 
the nominal payout vary across case types.81 The 2015 
Arbitration Study reports on aggregate attorneys’ fees, 
payouts to the class, and compensation rate by product-
category type.82 
This Article focuses on evaluating the efficiency of the 
class action as an instrument of compensation to class 
members and potential deterrence of harm-causing 
behaviors. The measure in this analysis of the cost of 
compensation via class-action settlements is the absolute 
amount paid to class counsel as fees. Note that this is clearly 
a substantial underestimate of the total social cost of 
awarding compensation via class-action settlements, for it 
ignores the attorneys’ fees charged by defendant’s counsel 
and also the cost of devoting the scarce time and resources of 
the federal courts to resolving class actions. As a measure of 
compensatory efficiency, this study reports attorneys’ fees 
relative to both the nominal settlement and actual aggregate 
payout to the class. This study also reports the compensation 
rate: the fraction of the class that actually receives 
compensation. 
As Appendix 1 shows, even the nominal class settlements 
in ATM notice failure class settlements were not large, 
ranging between $40,000 and $150,000. The actual 
aggregate payout to the class was even smaller, ranging 
 
80 See Shepherd, supra note 34. 
81 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 23. 
82 See 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 22. 
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between $8000 and $79,000. On average,83 the actual 
aggregate class recovery—the total amount received by class 
members—in the ATM notice failures was only 46% of the 
nominal settlement amount. On average, although 
individual class members who were paid each received $880, 
only 8.5% of the class received any compensation. By 
contrast, attorneys’ fees averaged 55% of the nominal 
settlement amount but 200% of the actual aggregate payout. 
In aggregate, rather than in average numbers, across all 
ATM notice failure settlements, the class compensation rate 
was a slightly higher 10%. However, the total payout to all 
class members was $169,500, with total attorneys’ fees of 
$198,000. Thus, even in aggregate, attorneys’ fees were 
larger than the amount paid to class members. 
Despite their relatively small payouts, the ATM notice 
failure cases demonstrate the behavior that Congress 
incentivized through statutory causes of action combining 
statutory damages without proof of harm with the class-
action procedural device. In general, the incentives cause a 
feeding frenzy of class-action filings even though the 
allegedly illegal behavior caused no actual harm. Congress 
recognized that the ATM notice failure cases involved no 
consumer harm when, in December 2012, Congress voted to 
eliminate the “on or at” ATM notice requirement.84 As the 
CFPB noted in its 2013 rulemaking, consumer groups had 
argued against this elimination on the ground that the “on or 
at” notice might have been a consumer’s only indication that 
the ATM would charge a fee-for-use.85 In the end, it seems 
that Congress agreed with the ATM providers’ 
commonsensical argument that since every ATM had an on-
 
83 Unless otherwise noted, only unweighted, numerical averages are 
reported. 
84 Act of Dec. 20, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-216, 126 Stat. 1590. 
85 Disclosures at Automated Teller Machines (Regulation E), 78 Fed. 
Reg. 18,221, 18,222 (Mar. 26, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1005). 
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screen fee notice, the “on or at” notice provided no social 
utility.86 
Second, the now-extinct ATM notice failure class actions 
demonstrate that class compensation rates in class 
settlements—the fraction of a class that actually gets any 
money from the settlement—are sometimes low simply 
because the class actions involve small stakes. For small-
stakes class actions to be economically attractive to class 
attorneys, courts must ensure a sufficiently low cost of 
notifying class members of settlements. But low-cost notice is 
more often than not ineffective notice. In the case of ATM 
notice failure settlements, the average reported 
compensation rate was only 8.5%.87 This low compensation 
 
86 Zero social utility had to be balanced against the facts that, not 
only was it costly for ATM owners to maintain such notices, but the tidal 
wave of ATM notice litigation was adding to financial institution costs 
with some of the litigation (at least according to the banking industry) 
manufactured by plaintiffs whom banks believed (but had difficulties 
proving) had deliberately removed ATM notices just to generate a cause of 
action. See Disclosures at Automated Teller Machines (Regulation E), 78 
Fed. Reg. at 18,222.  
87 As Appendix 1 reports, in Barreto v. Center Bank, the 
compensation rate was 5%, and in Loewy v. RBS Citizens Bank, the class 
compensation rate was 12%. The average compensation rate for these two 
ATM “on or at” notice cases is 8.5%, and that is the number reported above 
in the text. This rate is consistent with what one would infer from the 
information reported about other ATM “on or at” notice cases. As can be 
seen from Appendix 1, in several ATM “on or at” notice cases (Goldshteyn, 
Nguyen, and Louisma), class counsel did provide an estimate of the 
number of allegedly un-noticed ATM transactions. Over the three cases, 
this number was large, averaging 19,400 for the three cases. To convert 
the number of ATM transactions into a rough estimate of the number of 
actual class members, one can divide the total number of transactions 
challenged by the number of months during which the ATM was allegedly 
un-noticed and then divide that by an estimate of the number of ATM uses 
per month per user. Assuming that each person using an ATM used that 
machine on average five times per month (a seemingly large number), 
then a fair estimate of the number of class members would be 772 for 
Goldshteyn, 171 for Nguyen, and 400 in Louisma. As 42 class members 
were compensated in Goldshteyn, 75 in Nguyen, and 44 in Louisma, the 
rough estimate of compensation rates in these three class settlements 
would be (respectively) 5%, 44%, and 11%. Two of these estimates are 
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rate did not result from the technical impossibility of 
determining who used a particular ATM machine on a 
particular date. In each of the settlements in Appendix 1, 
class counsel submitted an affidavit from the same Senior 
Vice President at First American Bank explaining the 
following procedure to identify who used a particular ATM 
on a given day.88 First, one can obtain the bank routing 
number associated with each ATM transaction. Using those 
routing numbers, one can cross-reference and identify which 
financial institution issued each ATM card. Finally, one can 
contact each financial institution to identify the ATM card-
holder.89 No court disputed that the Senior Vice President’s 
affidavit showed that, with enough effort, the precise 
identity of each ATM user could be learned. But in every 
such case, notice to the class was given via a general public 
newspaper notice and a website.  
As indicated by the low compensation rate, such public 
notice was glaringly ineffective. District courts approved 
such a notice method because, given the small stakes in 
these cases, actual individualized notice would have been 
cost prohibitive. In other words, actual individualized notice 
 
almost identical to the actual class compensation rates of 5% and 12% in 
Barreto and Loewy, respectively. The estimated 44% compensation rate in 
Nguyen is so much higher than in any other ATM “on or at” notice case 
that one suspects that the assumption that users of an ATM use the 
machine on average 5 times per month must be incorrect for the ATM 
machines at issue in that case. Further evidence that the 8.5% class 
compensation rate in Table 2 may be generally valid for ATM “on or at” 
notice cases is provided by a report from class counsel in Barreto that, as 
“the claim form return rate in consumer class action settlements is 
between 2 and 20%,” the 5% rate in Barreto (a total of 18 claimants) was 
“well within the average return rate in the consumer class action context.” 
Plaintiff’s Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Final Approval of the 
Parties’ Class Action Settlement Agreement at 1–2, Barreto v. Ctr. Bank, 
No. 10-cv-06544 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2011).  
88 See the Affidavit of Eduardo Monteagudo, Exhibit D to Class 
Counsel’s Memorandum in Support of Final Approval of the Class Action 
Settlement para. 3; Goldshteyn v. Argonne Credit Union, No. 10-cv-05402 
(N.D. Ill. April 20, 2012), ECF No. 55-4. 
89 Id. 
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would have cost far more than the maximum expected 
recovery. As a result, such cases would never have been 
brought because they would be economically unattractive to 
plaintiffs’ attorneys. 
While, as cautioned at the outset, this Article does not 
confirm the representativeness of the Illinois Data, 
compensation rates in the Illinois Data seem likely to be 
typical of rates in ATM “on or at” notice failure cases more 
generally. In certain cases, class counsel filed memoranda in 
support of their motions for class settlement approval 
showing typical nationwide payout rates for ATM notice 
failure cases. For example, in Barreto v. Center Bank, 
counsel reported that 5% of the settlement class received 
compensation.90 Class counsel also reported that because the 
claim form return rate in consumer class-action settlements 
is typically between 2% and 20%, the 5% rate in Barreto (a 
total of 18 claimants) was “well within the average return 
rate in the consumer class-action context.”91 In addition, 
class counsel in Barreto reported that “the typical range of 
claimants in EFTA class settlements involving one ATM 
(like this one) is between 20 and 40.”92 The claim filing rate 
of 2–20% in consumer class actions comes from an article 
written by a claims administrator with Rust Consulting.93 
That settlement administrator reports that: “[w]ith their 
broad range of subject matter, benefit types and amounts, 
and class member demographics, as well as the ‘hit-or-miss’ 
availability of mailing lists, consumer settlements can draw 
a filing rate between 2 and 20 percent.”94 
 
90 Plaintiff’s Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Final 
Approval of the Parties’ Class Action Settlement Agreement at 1, Barreto 
v. Ctr. Bank, No. 10-cv-06544 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2011). 
91 Id. at 1–2. 
92 Id. at 2. 
93 See Tiffaney Janowicz, Class Action Perspectives: Anticipating 
Claims Filing Rates in Class Action Settlements (Mar. 6, 2013) 
(unpublished paper) (on file with the Federation of Defense & Corporate 
Counsel), http://www.thefederation.org/documents/16.Class%20Action%20
Perceptives.html [https://perma.cc/7FV3-KJKY]. 
94 Id.  
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Finally, ATM notice failure cases demonstrate that even 
in seemingly simple cases, defendants will not settle until 
they exhaust every legally plausible defense making 
economic sense. Indeed, evolution of the potential legal 
defenses to ATM notice failure cases explains the evolution 
in outcomes in such cases over the 2010–2012 period. During 
2010, defendants won fully a third of the ATM notice cases 
by making an offer of judgment to the named plaintiff and 
then moving to dismiss the case as moot.95 This tactic—
buying out the named plaintiff and therefore mooting the 
class action—was possible under the Seventh Circuit 
precedent Damasco v. Clearwire Corp.96 Once the defendant 
“offers to satisfy the plaintiff’s entire demand, there is no 
dispute over which to litigate, and a plaintiff who refuses to 
acknowledge this loses outright, under [FRCP] 12(b)(1), 
because he has no remaining stake.”97 As the plaintiff in 
Clearwire pointed out, other circuits had created a rule that 
allows named class plaintiffs to avoid mootness by 
expeditiously moving to certify the class even after being 
offered complete relief.98 The Seventh Circuit held that such 
an exception to mootness in class actions was unnecessary 
because class counsel could move to certify the class at the 
same time they file the complaint.99 Class counsel could also 
request that the court delay ruling on the motion to certify 
the class to allow time for substantial discovery on the class 
certification issue.100 
In 2010, plaintiffs lost many of the ATM notice class 
actions. In some instances, defendant established the 
affirmative defense that it had posted the required notice but 
 
95 See Stiltz v. Blackstone ATM LLC, No. 10-cv-01997 (N.D. Ill. 2010); 
Stiltz v. Standard Bank & Trust Co., No. 10-cv-01996 (N.D. Ill 2010); Stiltz 
v. Global Cash Network, Inc., No. 10-cv-01998 (N.D. Ill. 2010). 
96 Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(quoting Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 1991)). 
97 Id.  
98 Id. at 895–96. 
99 Id. at 896.  
100 Id. 
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the notice was removed through no fault of the defendant.101 
Most, however, were lost because defendants made offers of 
full judgment before plaintiffs had requested class 
certification, thus mooting these cases under the Seventh 
Circuit’s Clearwire decision. However, as one can discern 
from the pleadings, by 2011, class counsel had learned how 
to deal with the mootness problem by filing motions for class 
certification early on, or telling the court that they were 
going to do so. And class counsel had learned how to better 
prove notice violations: they took photos of ATMs over the 
course of several days before the named plaintiffs tried to 
use an ATM without the “on or at” notice. As a result, ATM 
notice class actions in 2011 and 2012 almost always 
succeeded in generating some kind of settlement for the 
individual plaintiff and/or the class: 92% of the cases filed in 
2011 and 83% of the cases filed in 2012 resulted in a 
settlement. 
Admittedly, as Table 1 shows, the type of settlement was 
radically different between cases filed in 2011 and those filed 
in 2012. In 2011, 38% of the ATM notice failure class-action 
filings resulted in class settlements. None of the ATM notice 
failure class actions filed in 2012 resulted in class 
settlements; parties agreed only to individual settlements. 
The reason undoubtedly is that by the time the 2012 filings 
reached the point where settlement discussions could begin, 
all parties recognized that Congress was soon to amend the 
statute to eliminate the basis of the cause of action for all 
future cases. Congressional elimination of the cause of action 
would likely have made it difficult to justify the fairness of a 
class-action settlement to the court. 
 
C. Class Actions Under the Other Major Federal 
Consumer Protection Statutes 
ATM notice failure class actions under the EFTA are now 
extinct, but consumer class actions survive across the 
 
101 See, e.g., Reyes v. Cole Taylor Bank, No. 10-cv-02181 (N.D. Ill. 
2010), ECF No. 55 (opinion granting summary judgment to defendant). 
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country under the FCRA, FDCPA, and TCPA. As illustrated 
by Figure 3 (reproducing graphically the data from Table 1 
above), the frequency of various outcomes differs across case 
types. In particular, the distribution of outcomes under the 
FDCPA involves a much higher probability of an individual 
settlement (and hence overall settlement rate) than occurs 
under both the TCPA and FCRA. As a statistical matter, the 
outcome distribution under the FDCPA is significantly 
different than the outcome distribution under both the 
FCRA102 and the TCPA.103 The qualitative discussion of 
outcomes under the various statutes that follows below sets 
out some potential explanations for the distinctiveness of 
FDCPA outcomes. 
 





102 With the FDCPA distribution taken as the null, F(4,n) = 15, 
allowing one to reject the hypothesis of identical distributions with p < .01. 
103 Again with the FDCPA distribution taken as the null, 
F(4,n) = 121, which allows one to reject the hypothesis of identical 
distributions with p < .001. 
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The FCRA has created the same sort of problem as in the 
old ATM notice failure cases: a feeding frenzy of case filings 
with easy-to-prove statutory violations and statutory damage 
rights available without even an allegation of harm. 
 
1. The Fair Credit Reporting Act 
Passed in 1970, in the heyday of federal consumer 
protection legislation, Congress enacted the FCRA104 to 
ensure that the information held by consumer reporting 
agencies was accurate, kept private, and to be used only for 
certain authorized purposes. The FCRA imposes potential 
liability on both users and providers of consumer credit 
reports. Under the FCRA, employment background checks 
are included within the regulated category of “consumer 
reports.” An employer who uses such a report in its hiring 
decisions is thus regulated under the FCRA as a user of a 
consumer report. The FCRA requires that an employer 
comply with several procedural steps in using an 
employment background check.105 First, the employer must 
tell the prospective employee that it might use the 
information in the report in an employment decision, and it 
must ask the employee for written permission before getting 
the report. Once the employer gets the report, if the 
employer believes the report might influence its decision, 
then it must give the prospective employee a copy of a 
standard “Summary of Rights” produced by the Federal 
Trade Commission. If the employer bases a decision on data 
contained in the report, such as criminal or credit history, 
then it must give the prospective employee contact 
information for the report provider and an explanation that 
the report provider did not make the actual employment 
decision. The explanation must also state that the report 
provider will not be able to explain the decision and that the 
 
104 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). 
105 See Consumer Information: Background Checks, FTC (Nov. 2016), 
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0157-background-checks 
[https://perma.cc/VW9H-3A76]. 
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prospective employee has an opportunity to dispute the 
information in the report before the employer takes action 
based on it.106 If the employer takes an adverse action based 
on the background report, then it must notify the applicant 
within a reasonable time.107 
In 2003, FACRA was amended by the passage of the Fair 
and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (“FACTA”).108 
Intended to better ensure consumer privacy and 
standardized reporting, FACTA did two things of relevance 
to the class-action filings in the Illinois Data. First, it added 
a liability provision. If a consumer can establish a “willful” 
FCRA violation, he or she may recover attorneys’ fees, costs, 
punitive damages, and statutory damages between $100 and 
$1000 without the need to prove actual injury. A consumer 
may also recover damages and attorneys’ fees and costs for 
bad faith conduct.109 Second, FACTA regulated credit card 
receipts issued by retail merchants, providing that “no 
person that accepts credit cards or debit cards for the 
transaction of business shall print more than the last 5 digits 
of the card number or the expiration date upon any receipt 
provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale or 
transaction.”110 
Much early litigation under FACTA involved the question 
of whether defendants who claimed to be unaware of the 
statutory requirement to remove expiration dates from 
receipts could nonetheless be held liable for a “willful” 
FACTA violation. Federal courts established various 
standards for FACTA willfulness. Amid inconsistency among 
circuits, in the 2007 Safeco decision, the Supreme Court 
partially clarified the issue when it stated that under the 




108 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 
108-159, 117 Stat. 1955. 
109 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, o (2012). 
110 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g) (2012). 
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“reckless disregard” standard.111 The Court also held that 
“there is no need to pinpoint the negligence/recklessness 
line.”112 
Hundreds of FACTA class actions were filed after Safeco. 
Class counsels argued that the discovery cost of determining 
what a business knew or did not know about its receipts 
would only be economically feasible if plaintiffs could recover 
for the entire class. Businesses rebutted, opposing class 
certification on the ground that it risked imposing crushing 
billion-dollar liability for harmless technical FACTA 
violations.113 
In 2008, Congress amended FACTA by passing the Credit 
and Debit Card Receipt Clarification Act.114 According to 
Congress, this law was prompted by the “hundreds of 
lawsuits” filed against merchants who had mistakenly 
believed that FACTA compliance required them only to 
truncate credit card numbers and not the expiration date.115 
Congress found specifically that “[e]xperts in the field agree 
that proper truncation of the card number . . . regardless of 
the inclusion of the expiration date, prevents a potential 
fraudster from perpetrating identify theft or credit card 
fraud.”116 Congress retroactively shielded merchants from 
statutory liability damages even though they had violated 
FACTA by printing an expiration date on a receipt (between 
December 4, 2004 and June 3, 2008) because it “deemed 
these lawsuits to be a significant burden on businesses, 
without any corresponding consumer benefit.”117 Despite its 
 
111 Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 52 (2007). 
112 Id. at 69. 
113 See Bruce L. McDonald, Wiley Rein LLP, Congress Restricts 
FACTA Statutory Damages Class Actions, LEXOLOGY (July 7, 2008), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=464e8ebe-7ca0-4fa5-a3c7-
677143dfdce4 [https://perma.cc/V8NN-CCVC]. 
114 Act of June 3, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–241, 122 Stat. 1565. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Long v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 671 F.3d 371, 374 (3d Cir. 
2012) (citing Act of June 3, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–241, § 2(a)(7), 122 Stat. 
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finding that printing an expiration date alone did not 
increase the risk of credit card fraud, Congress retained 
potential FACTA willful violation liability for statutory 
damages for such an error on any receipt printed after June 
3, 2008.118 
The Illinois Data confirms that there continues to be a 
constant stream of class-action filings for violations of 
FCRA’s employment background check procedural 
requirements and violations of FACTA by merchants who 
printed a credit card expiration date on the receipt. Of the 
fifty-three FCRA class actions filed from 2010–2012 in the 
Northern District of Illinois, twenty-seven (51%) alleged that 
a card expiration date was illegally printed on a receipt. 
Seventeen (32%) alleged a failure to follow FCRA 
employment background check procedures. The remaining 
nine (or 17%) FCRA filings alleged an actual breach of 
privacy through the release of personally identifying 
information by a merchant. However, only one of the 
nineteen class-action settlements of FCRA cases involved the 
release of personally identifying information. Eleven (58%) 
and seven (37%) involved expiration date and employment 
background check cases, respectively. 
Viewing FCRA class-action settlements in the aggregate, 
$3,816,535 in attorneys’ fees were incurred to generate 
$6,056,909 in aggregate payouts to class members. A much 
smaller proportion of aggregate payouts was paid to class 
members here than in the ATM notice failure class actions. 
In addition, FCRA cases involved much bigger settlements, 
with an average settlement class of 45,715, an average 
nominal settlement of $775,645, and an aggregate payout of 
$413,052. Thus, in FCRA class-action settlements, the actual 
aggregate payout to class members averaged only 37% of the 
nominal settlement amount. Attorneys’ fees averaged 
$185,803. On average, it takes about thirteen months from 
 
1565, 1565–66; Act of June 3, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–241, § 3(a), 122 Stat. 
1565, 1566 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(d))). 
118 See id.  
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the case filing date for such settlements to receive final 
judicial approval. 
The high frequency of all types of FCRA class actions and 
the rapid finalization of class settlements in FCRA 
expiration date and employment background check litigation 
is indicative of the fact that such violations are easy to 
prove.119 Plaintiffs could easily prove the FCRA violation by 
producing their credit card receipt (in expiration date cases) 
or by the failure of the employer to provide the required 
notices and reports to the prospective employee (in the 
employment report cases). 
In both case types, the “willfulness” standard for the 
award of the statutory, non-injury damages of $1000 was 
easily met by class counsel. Through countless websites and 
blogs, attorneys and regulators have created sufficient 
general awareness of the FCRA’s requirements to establish 
statutory willfulness. For example, by 2010, plaintiffs in 
FACTA expiration date class actions routinely alleged that 
the willfulness requirement was met because credit card 
companies advised and contractually required merchants to 
truncate expiration dates. International consumer protection 
conventions also required such truncation.120 Defendants 
argued that such allegations were mere boilerplate, 
contained in every FACTA expiration date complaint, and 
that they did not establish recklessness as required by 
Supreme Court interpretations of FACTA.121 Courts rarely 
 
119 Indeed, only seven such cases ended in dismissal and only two of 
these dismissals were with prejudice; at least one of these two may have 
been an individual settlement. 
120 See, e.g., Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to 
Dismiss the Class Action Complaint at 11–12, Redman v. Take Care 
Health Sys., LLC, No. 11-cv-09044 (N.D. Ill. March 19, 2012), ECF No. 22. 
121 In Safeco Ins. Co. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57, 68–71 (2007), the 
Supreme Court held that “willfulness” under the FCRA means that the 
defendant’s conduct was reckless. Since that decision, lower courts have 
routinely understood this as a standard that asks whether a defendant’s 
interpretation of the FCRA’s requirements was “objectively reasonable.” 
These requirements very often involve technical questions of what 
information may and may not be contained in employment background 
 
JOHNSTON – FINAL  
44 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2017 
ruled on such arguments, usually made on FRCP 12(b)(6) 
motions to dismiss. Instead, at an identical mean time to 
settlement of thirteen months, parties reached both FCRA 
expiration date and background report class settlements. 
This suggests that the FACTA willfulness requirement has 
in practice provided very little protection for businesses 
under FACTA. Like the ATM “on or at” notice cases, FACTA 
expiration date cases are relatively easy for class counsels. 
Perhaps the most important respect in which the FCRA 
expiration date and employment background report cases 
resemble the ATM “on or at” notice cases is that neither type 
of violation involves any actual injury to a plaintiff. As for 
the expiration date cases, Congress found in 2008 that 
experts did not believe that the risk of credit card fraud 
decreases when a merchant prints out the expiration date 
but truncates the actual credit card number, as FACTA 
requires.122 Plaintiffs in FACTA expiration date cases do not 
allege that they have suffered harm, but seek statutory 
damages for willful violations. Federal courts that have 
found standing for plaintiffs alleging such FACTA violations 
have reasoned that the mere statutory violation itself can 
establish “injury” sufficient to meet constitutional standing 
requirements.123 And the injury in employment background 
reports—a failure to follow process—is precisely the type of 
injury for which plaintiffs have faced the most difficulty in 
establishing standing under the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional standing jurisprudence.124  
Figure 4 depicts class-action  settlements in all types of 
FCRA cases. As shown, the (smoothed)125 compensation rate 
 
check disclosures. See, e.g., Jones v. Halstead Mgmt. Co., 81 F. Supp. 3d 
324, 333, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Miller v. Quest Diagnostics, 85 F. Supp. 3d 
1058, 1061–62 (W.D. Mo. 2015). 
122 See supra, note 114 and accompanying text.  
123 See, e.g., Hammer v. Sam’s E., Inc., 754 F.3d 492 (8th Cir. 2014). 
124 See Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing 
Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret, 107 NW. U.L. REV. 169 (2012). 
125 It is the smoothing that creates the appearance of a potentially 
negative value of the compensation rate. 
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distribution has a double-peaked shape, with compensation 
rates around 10% being most frequent, but very high 
compensation also being relatively frequent. 
 





Figure 5 below helps to explain the double-peaked 
distribution of FCRA class compensation rates. The 37% 
class compensation rate in employment report class-action 
settlements is over three times the 12% compensation rate in 
expiration date cases.126 
 
 
126 Note that there is a single FCRA privacy settlement in the Illinois 
Data, and the reason that the compensation rate is so high in that case is 
because the relief there was free credit monitoring made available to the 
entire class. 
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In a (transformed)127 linear regression of compensation 
rate on case type (expiration date) and class size, reported in 
Table 3 below, expiration date cases have a lower 
compensation rate, a result that is significant at the 5% 
level. Increasing class size also lowers the compensation 









127 As the compensation rate is a variable confined to the (0,1) range, 
it is transformed using the LOGIT transformation in STATA before 
running the linear regression. 
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TABLE 3. FCRA COMPENSATION RATE REGRESSION 
RESULTS 
 
Perhaps most noteworthy about the FCRA class 
settlements is the enormous discrepancy between attorneys’ 
fees and the aggregate class recovery for expiration date 
cases. As Figure 6 depicts, if one considered attorneys’ fees in 
such cases only relative to the nominal settlement, they 
would appear to be quite reasonable. But at an average of 
1100% of the amount that the class actually recovers, 
attorneys’ fees dwarf the class’ recovery. Attorneys’ fees are 
actually likely to be even more disproportionate relative to 
class recovery in expiration date cases than Figure 6 depicts, 
for several expiration date class settlements involved in-kind 
relief to the class—things like coupons or sale days—that 



















Coef. Std. Err. T P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
Class Size -6.27e-06 8.72e-06 -0.72 0.486 -.0000253 .0000127 
Expiration 
Date Dummy 
-2.221758 .9972362 -2.23 0.046 -4.394549 -.048967 
Constant -.0611625 .6825851 -0.09 0.930 -1.548388 1.426063 
JOHNSTON – FINAL  
48 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2017 
FIGURE 6. FCRA ATTORNEYS’ FEES AS FRACTION OF NOMINAL 




2. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
The most common class-action filing in the Illinois Data 
was under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). 
Enacted as one of the core vintage 1970 federal consumer 
protection statutes, Congress intended the FDCPA to stop 
various abusive debt collection practices.128 Successful 
FDCPA plaintiffs are entitled to a broad range of 
compensatory damages, including damages for lost wages, 
physical and mental distress, and statutory damages up to 
$1000 without proof of harm.129 In a class action, the FDCPA 
limits statutory damages recovered on behalf of absent class 
members to the lesser of $500,000 or 1% of the debt 
 
128 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to 
eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors . . . .”). 
129 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) (2012). 
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collector’s net worth.130 The FDCPA, as amended, includes 
six main sections that prohibit a variety of actions by debt 
collectors. The FDCPA filings analyzed in this Article can be 
organized into several functional categories that cut across 
these statutory provisions. 
 
a. Formality Failure 
The FDCPA imposes a number of formal disclosure 
requirements on debt collectors. The most numerically 
important cases in the Illinois Data include those that allege 
a failure to follow one or more of these formalities, which 
make up 50% of all FDCPA filings (71 out of 141).131 
Formality failures fall into three distinct sub-categories. 
The first type, phone identification, describes cases where a 
debt collector did not properly identify himself or herself 
when contacting the debtor.132 These cases often involve debt 
collectors leaving phone messages asking the consumer to 
call back without giving the necessary warning. 
The second type of FDCPA formality failure, a letter 
notice, describes cases where a debt collector sends a letter 
notice to the consumer that violates the requirements in 15 
U.S.C. § 1692g. Examples of this subcategory include letter 
notices that (1) did not provide effective notice of the 30-day 
verification period, (2) failed to effectively identify the name 
of the creditor, (3) failed to include that any dispute or 
request for name of the original creditor must be in writing, 
and (4) failed to include the principal and interest amounts, 
stating only the total amount due.133 
 
130 § 1692k(a)(2)(B). 
131 The denominator is larger than the number of actual FDCPA 
filings because ten FDCPA cases included alleged violations in several 
categories. 
132 The failure by a debt collector to disclose in the initial 
communication with the consumer that he or she is a debt collector, that 
the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt, and that any information 
gathered in the communication will be used for that purpose, is in 
violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2012). 
133 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (2012). 
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The third subcategory of FDCPA formality violations 
describes cases in which a debt collector violated a state law 
requirement (“State Law Violations”). Most commonly, these 
violations occur when a party attempts to collect debt 
without being properly licensed as a collection agency under 
state law.134 
 
b. Bad Debt 
Bad debt cases comprise the second-highest number of 
FDCPA filings in the Illinois Data (39 of 141, or 28%). These 
cases can be broken down into three sub-categories. The 
first, bad debt interest, describes cases in which a party 
impermissibly adds interest to the debt principal. In the 
typical case, a debt purchaser retroactively adds interest 
that should have accrued before the purchase, despite the 
original creditor’s refusal to do so.135 The second subcategory 
of bad debt filing, time-barred, refers to cases in which a debt 
collector attempts to collect a debt after the date that it is no 
longer collectable.136 
The last bad debt subcategory, bad affidavit, describes 
cases in which a debt purchaser provides a fraudulent 
affidavit to consumers in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. In 
the typical case, the purchaser falsely represents to 
 
134 These cases alleged that engaging in this action constituted a 
false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with 
the collection of any debt under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2012). 
135 The FDCPA prohibits the use of “unfair or unconscionable means 
to collect or attempt to collect any debt,” including “[t]he collection of any 
amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the 
principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the 
agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f 
(2012). As such, any addition of interest to the debt outside of the original 
agreement creating the debt is a possible violation. 
136 The FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from using any unfair or 
unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect a debt. Attempting to 
collect a debt that is time-barred, or, in the alternative, wrongly indicating 
that a debt is time–barred, is an unfair or unconscionable means to collect 
a debt. Id. 
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consumers that it could prove the debt. Oftentimes, the 
purchaser conceals documents containing express 
disclaimers about the enforceability and validity of the debt 
(“as is” clauses). Other cases involving fraudulent affidavits 
include the impermissible modification of an affidavit after 
the affiant signed it. 
 
c. Litigation Threat 
A relatively small fraction (7 out of 141, or 5%) were 
based on an alleged threat by the debt collector that it would 
take legal action against the consumer if the debt was not 
paid off, despite the fact that legal action would not be taken. 
Often, these cases involved debt collectors who routinely do 
not file suit to collect on small debts yet represented to the 
consumer that they would do so. Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, a 
debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading 
representation or means in connection with the collection of 
any debt. This includes the threat to take any action that the 




The final FDCPA category, called harassment, includes 
cases alleging egregious behavior by the party attempting to 
collect the debt. For example, a debt collector might 
repeatedly and continuously call a consumer without prior 
authorization to do so and with intent to annoy, abuse, or 
harass. The debt collector might also attempt to embarrass 
the consumer by calling third parties related to the 
consumer, often using inappropriate methods such as auto-
dial and pre-recorded messages. Some of these cases involved 
debts the consumer did not owe.138 There were sixteen cases 
in the harassment category (11% of all FDCPA filings). 
 
137 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2012). 
138 These attempts may be in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b, 1692c, 
1692d, 1692e.  
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e. Other 
Two cases that did not appear to fall under any of the 
previous four categories were placed in the “other” category. 
These included a case in which a debt collector reported false 
information about the debt to consumer reporting agencies, 
and a case in which a debt collector purchased healthcare 
debts and then purported that payments on those debts 
constituted acceptance of a revolving credit line from the 
debtor. 
As can be seen from Figure 7 below, class-action 
settlements by FDCPA case type closely track the filings 
sample proportions for the two main case types, formalities 
and bad debt, with filings/class settlement proportions being 
51/54% for formalities and 23/28% for bad debt. At 15% 
versus 5%, only for litigation threat type cases was the class 
settlement proportion far above the proportion of filings. 
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In aggregate, attorneys’ fees of $787,525 were incurred to 
generate FDCPA class settlement payouts of $1,365,662. On 
average, FDCPA are small class-action settlements for small 
classes, with an average class size of 4,882, an average 
nominal settlement of $58,724, and average attorneys’ fees of 
$31,500. The small size of even nominal settlements reflects 
the small number of class members and the FDCPA’s 
statutory limitation on statutory damages in class-action 
cases. These settlements take some time to achieve. On 
average, final judicial approval takes seventeen months after 
the complaint is filed. The mean aggregate payout to the 
class in FDCPA class settlements is $54,626, a full 88% of 
the nominal settlement. Moreover, on unweighted average, 
25% of the class receives compensation in an FDCPA class 
settlement. 
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Figure 8 shows the (smoothed) distribution of the 
compensation rate across all FDCPA case types. Figure 9 
breaks out the compensation rate by FDCPA case type. As 
Figure 8 shows, the majority of FDCPA settlements involve a 
class compensation rate of less than 20%. The compensation 
rates across types of FDCPA cases in Figure 9 shows that 
the mean compensation rate in FDCPA cases varies by an 
order of magnitude across case types, from 7% for the three 
cases alleging unlawful litigation threats to 70% for the one 
settlement in a case alleging a bad affidavit. Restricting 
attention to the two most frequent FDCPA settlement types, 
those alleging a failure of the debt collector to follow a 
required formality and those alleging attempts to collect on a 
bad debt, shows that the mean compensation rate varies 
from 47% for the bad debt settlements to 16% for the 
formality settlements. The difference in the compensation 
rate across case types is statistically significant (with F(3,21) 
= 9.8, p < .007). 
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Unlike compensation rates, as Figure 10 shows, 
attorneys’ fees relative to the nominal class settlement 
amounts and aggregate payouts do not vary as much across 
FDCPA case types, ranging only from .35 to .42. Aside from 
formality FDCPA cases, the ratio of attorneys’ fees to the 
aggregate payout to the class varies less. But fees are high, 
averaging at least 64% of the class payout for all case types. 
These high fees reflect the fact that courts award attorneys’ 
fees based on the reasonable value of class counsel’s time 
spent on the case. Courts do not base attorneys’ fees by 
comparing attorneys’ fees to the recovery (on a common fund 
theory of fee recovery) because the FDCPA limits actual 
recovery to the lower of $500,000 or 1% of the defendant’s 
net worth. This net worth consideration likely explains why 
attorneys’ fees in formality FDCPA cases are higher than 
other FDCPA case types. On average, attorneys’ fees in 
formality FDCPA cases equal the actual aggregate amount 
paid to the class.139 
 
139 The net worth limitation was mentioned in memoranda arguing 
for judicial approval of the class settlement in 87% of FDCPA formality 
violation class settlements, versus in only 33% of bad debt FDCPA class 
settlements (the only other FDCPA case with more than one class 
settlement). With z = 2.06, this difference is significant at the .02 level. 
The formality class settlements with approval memoranda justifying the 
settlement by reference to the net worth limitation are Tuntevich v. 
Levenfeld Pearlstein, LLC, No 10-cv-02093 (N.D. Ill. 2010), Pawelczak v. 
Bureau of Collection Recovery, LLC, No. 11-cv-01415 (N.D. Ill. 2011), 
Pawelczak v. Financial Recovery Services, Inc. No. 11-cv-02214 (N.D. Ill. 
2011), Braatz v. Leading Edge Recovery Solutions, Inc., No. 11-cv-03835 
(N.D. Ill. 2011), Walls v. United Collection Bureau, Inc., No. 11-cv-06026 
(N.D. Ill. 2011), Rice v. Praxis Financial Solutions, Inc., No 11-cv-08488 
(N.D. Ill. 2011), Wilfong v. National Capital Management, LLC, No. 12-cv-
02979 (N.D. Ill. 2012), Repika v. Accelerated Financial Solutions, LLC , 
No. 12-cv-04290 (N.D. Ill. 2012), Glover v. Alpha Recovery Corp., No. 12-
cv-04355 (N.D. Ill 2012), Kallenhorn v. J.C. Christensen Associates, Inc., 
No. 12-c-v06056 (N.D. Ill. 2012), Halliday v. Law Offices of David A. Kolb, 
P.C., No. 12-cv-06705 (N.D. Ill. 2012), Smith v. J.C. Christensen & 
Associates, Inc., No. 12-cv-07023 (N.D. Ill. 2012), and Kalish v. Transworld 
Systems, No. 12-cv-08614 (N.D. Ill. 2012), while the formality settlements 
whose approval memoranda do not mention the net worth limitation are 
Donahue v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., No. 10-cv-04619 (N.D. Ill. 
 
JOHNSTON – FINAL  
56 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2017 
FIGURE 10. FDCPA ATTORNEYS’ FEES AS FRACTION OF 
NOMINAL SETTLEMENT AMOUNT AND ACTUAL AGGREGATE 




3. Telephone Consumer Protection Act 
The TCPA prohibits autodialed telephone calls, faxes, and 
emails if the recipient has not given prior consent.140 The 
 
2010) and Krenzelak v. The Brachfield Law Group, No. 12-cv-03325 (N.D. 
Ill. 2012).  For the most common non-formality class settlement, bad debt 
settlements that do mention that net worth limitation in the memoranda 
justifying approval are Wysocki v. City National Bank, No. 10-cv-03850 
(ND. Ill. 2010) and Jones v. National Credit Adjusters, LLC, No. 10-cv-
0802 (N.D. Ill. 2010), while bad debt settlements that do not mention the 
net worth limit are Skusenas v. Lindebarger et al., No. 10-cv-08119 (N.D. 
Ill. 2010), Schallhammer v. Gateway Recovery Assoc., Inc., No 11-cv-00621 
(N.D. Ill. 2011), Stumpf v. PYOD, LLC, No. 12-cv-04688 (N.D. Ill. 2012), 
and Grandalski v. Encore Receivable Management Inc., No. 12-cv-05423 
(N.D. Ill 2012).  Further details on these settlements can be found in the 
filing details descriptions available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.18130/V3/WR4RF9. 
140 With exceptions discussed below, the TCPA makes it unlawful: 
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TCPA permits such communications in two discrete 
circumstances: (1) if the recipient voluntarily gave the 
sender his or her phone number within the context of an 
already-established business relationship; or (2) if the 
recipient published its fax number on an Internet site.141 
Importantly, like the other federal consumer protection 
statutes discussed in this article, the TCPA allows class-
action plaintiffs to claim either actual damages or statutory 
damages of $500 without proof of injury. The TCPA gives the 
trial court the discretion to award treble damages, up to 
$1500 per violation, if the plaintiff can prove that the 
defendant “willfully or knowingly” violated the statute. 
Importantly, under the TCPA, statutory damages accrue per 
violation.142 
Unlike the other statutory causes of action discussed 
here, because TCPA damages aggregate across thousands 
and in some cases millions of unconsented autodialed 
communications, TCPA class actions are often huge. On 
average, each TCPA class-action settlement in the Illinois 
Data contained 1,901,402 class members. TCPA settlements 
on average produce a nominal settlement of $7,377,495 and 
an aggregate payout of $6,293,547 (or 85% of the average 
nominal settlement). Attorneys’ fees average $2,225,213; 
however, the time between case filing and judicial approval 
 
to make any [unauthorized] call . . . using any automatic 
telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded 
voice . . . to any telephone number assigned to a paging 
service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio 
service, or other radio common carrier service, or any 
service for which the called party is charged for the call . . . 
to initiate any telephone call to any residential telephone 
line using an artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a 
message without the prior express consent of the called 
party, . . . [and] to use any telephone facsimile machine, 
computer, or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile 
machine, an unsolicited advertisement.  
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1) (2012). 
141 Id.  
142 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2012). 
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of a final settlement is on average twenty-six months. 
Moreover, the unweighted average compensation rate in 
TCPA settlements is only 19%. As far as the aggregate 
performance goes, in TCPA class-action settlements, 
attorneys’ fees of $76,945,118.49 were incurred to generate 
nominal settlements totaling $223,032,294. As actual 
aggregate payouts total $188,964,180, attorneys’ fees in 
TCPA class settlements were 41% of the aggregate class 
payout. 
The TCPA cases fall into three broad case types: (1) those 
involving autodialed phone calls (or, less often, a text 
message) made as part of the debt collection process (42% of 
all TCPA filings); (2) those involving an unauthorized 
marketing fax (31% of all filings); and (3) those involving a 
marketing text, call, or email (27% of all filings). However, at 
44% each, debt call and marketing fax case types account for 
the vast majority of TCPA class settlements (with marketing 
call, text, or email cases making up the remainder of class 
settlements). 
 Debt call and marketing fax class settlements are at 
opposite ends of the TCPA spectrum. Of the marketing fax 
class settlements, 87% involved doctors’ and dentists’ offices 
or other businesses that received unsolicited telemarketing 
faxes. Class-action settlements in marketing fax cases 
involved moderately large to small classes averaging 14,717 
members. As Figure 11 shows, at .11, the average 
compensation rate in debt call TCPA class settlements was 
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Looking at the (smoothed) distribution of the claims rate 
across all TCPA case subtypes, and then as depicted in 
Figure 12 below, we see that, as with all other case types, the 
distribution is highly skewed, with most settlements 
involving a claims rate of less than 20%. If we compute the 
compensation rate weighted by the relative class size 
compensated, we find that the weighted compensation rate 
in TCPA debt call class settlements is only 4%. The weighted 
compensation rate in TCPA marketing fax settlements is 
21%. 
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Debt call and marketing fax cases differ in a number of 
ways. Debt call settlements had an average class size of 
5,905,313, while marketing fax classes were much smaller, 
averaging 22,090 members.143 In debt call class settlements, 
the mean aggregate payout to the class was $12,156,263, 
almost six times larger than the mean aggregate payout of 
$2,255,563 in all other TCPA class settlements.144 Moreover, 
the average individual payout to class members actually 
receiving compensation in TCPA debt call settlements of 
 
143 There were 53,341,705 class members in debt call settlements and 
309,260 class members in marketing fax settlements (counting Martin and 
Patterson as a single settlement).  
144 A difference that with F(1,26) = 3.26 has p < .08. 
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around145 $289 was much smaller than the average payout of 
$453 in marketing fax settlements. 
Importantly, the $289 payout in debt call settlements is 
an unweighted average. Two of the class settlements in the 
Illinois Data, Patterson v. Capital Management and Martin 
v. Leading Edge Recovery Solutions, Inc., were part of the 
settlement of three class actions consolidated under the 
caption In Re Capital One.146 That litigation included almost 
half of all class members in the Illinois Data (17,522,049). 
Further, the individual payout to members in Capital One 
who actually received compensation was only $34.60.147 
Moreover, in the largest TCPA class settlement, Gehrich v. 
J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, with over 19,000,000 class 
members (over half of the class members in the sample if one 
counts In re Capital One as a single settlement), the class 
settlement was approved without any information given 
regarding the individual payout that class members could 
expect. 
In terms of how the cost of achieving a class settlement 
compares with the actual results for class members, TCPA 
class settlements seem to be almost as bad as FCRA and the 
old ATM EFTA notice failure class settlements.148 As Figure 
13 shows below, other than for debt call settlements, 
attorneys’ fees as a fraction of the nominal class settlement 
are right around the contingency fee standard of 33%. 
However, for every type of TCPA class settlement, attorneys’ 
fees are greater than or (roughly) equal to the actual 
aggregate class recovery. For marketing fax settlements, 
 
145 This is the minimum because in some settlements, only the 
amount paid per fax was reported in the settlement, making it possible 
that some class members may have received compensation for multiple 
unsolicited faxes. 
146 In re Capital One Telephone Consumer Protection Act Litigation, 
No. 12-cv-10064, MDL No. 2416 (N.D. Ill. 2012) 
147 This is the amount reported by the court in approving the class 
settlement with a reduction in attorneys’ fees to a little over $15 million. 
See In re Capital One Telephone Consumer Protection Act Litigation, 80 F. 
Supp. 3d 781, 783 (N.D. Ill. 2015). 
148 For details on the ATM notice failure settlements, see Appendix 1. 
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which, as noted above, make up almost half of all TCPA class 
settlements, class counsel is awarded fees that are on 
average equal to 260% of what the class members actually 
receive in compensation. 
 
FIGURE 13. TCPA ATTORNEYS’ FEES AS FRACTION OF 




It is true that attorneys’ fees in some of the largest TCPA 
class settlements are a much lower fraction of the aggregate 
class recovery. For example, in the In re Capital One 
litigation, which included two class settlements in the 
Illinois Data, attorneys’ fees comprise only 28% of the 
amount actually paid to the class.149 However, while one can 
 
149 From In re Capital One Telephone Consumer Protection Act 
Litigation, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 787, one learns that if the initially requested 
attorneys’ fee of over $22 million had been approved, then class members 
would have received in aggregate $47,700,569.  However, as the court 
approved only $15,668,265 in attorneys’ fees, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 809, the 
actual amount paid to class members was about $53,650,569, so that 
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identify statistically the factors that influence judges to give 
big attorneys’ fees, no statistically significant relationship is 
apparent between attorneys’ fees as a fraction of class 
recovery and any other descriptive or outcome variables. 
This is shown by Tables 4 and 5 below, which present the 
results of ordinary least squares regression runs. Table 4 
shows that, as one would expect, attorneys’ fees increase 
with both the size of the nominal settlement and the size of 
the class (with the effect statistically significant at the 7% 
and 5% levels, respectively). It is noteworthy that the 
variables describing how the class fared under the 
settlement—the compensation rate and the aggregate 
compensation—do not approach statistical significance.  
 
TABLE 4. ATTORNEYS’ FEES REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
Attys’ Fees Coef. Std. Err. T P>t [95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
Duration -38,138.71 24,466.9 -1.56 0.135 -89,175.77 12,898.34 
Comp. Rate 101,043.4 613,931.5 0.16 0.871 -1,179,595 1,381,682 
Market Fax -519589.5 289,635.8 -1.79 0.088 -1,123,759 84,580.26 
Class Size .1233503 .0601498 2.05 0.054 -.0021199 .2488206 
Nominal Settle .2436162 .1269004 1.92 0.069 -.0210934 .5083257 
Agg Payout -.0933392 .1831329 -0.51 0.616 -.4753478 .2886694 
Constant 1,264,462 575,598.1 2.20 0.040 63,785.26 2,465,139 
 
In a regression on the same explanatory variables, where 
the variable to be explained is not the absolute magnitude of 
attorneys’ fees but the ratio of such fees to the actual 
aggregate payout to the class, there are no relationships that 
even approach statistical significance. This is shown by 
Table 5, which also confirms that the court does not consider 
 
finally approved attorney fees were about 28% of the amount received by 
the class.  Note that the court, like all District Courts, reported, attorneys’ 
fees relative to the nominal settlement of over $75 million, not relative to 
the actual aggregate payment to the class. 80 F. Supp. 3d at 787. 
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the actual amount paid to the class when determining 
whether to approve a fee award. 
 










Duration .0880711 .1335203 0.66 0.517 -.1904474 .3665896 
Com. Rate -3.924143 3.350336 -1.17 0.255 -10.91282 3.064536 
Market Fax 2.379641 1.580595 1.51 0.148 -.9174233 5.676705 
Class Size -1.97e-07 3.28e-07 -0.60 0.556 -8.81e-07 4.88e-07 
Nominal 
Settle 
4.91e-07 6.93e-07 0.71 0.486 -9.53e-07 1.94e-06 
Agg Payout -7.52e-07 9.99e-07 -0.75 0.460 -2.84e-06 1.33e-06 
Constant -.7224982 3.141144 -0.23 0.820 -7.274809 5.829813 
 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NORTHERN DISTRICT 
OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE FOR THE SOCIAL 
UTILITY OF CLASS ACTIONS UNDER FEDERAL 
CONSUMER PROTECTION STATUTES 
One must be cautious in drawing general implications 
from any particular sample. However, the evidence from the 
Northern District of Illinois over the period 2010–2012 has 
several implications for the performance of class actions 
under federal consumer protection statutes. Importantly, 
these implications only apply to cases brought under those 
statutes discussed in this Article. As a subsequent article 
will explain, consumer class-action filings in the Northern 
District brought under state statute and common law have 
somewhat different implications for consumer class actions. 
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A. Social Welfare Implications of Incentivizing Class-
Action Settlements Where There May be No Harm 
to Consumers 
As noted in the introductory discussion of the Court’s 
recent decision in Spokeo v. Robins, after that decision, class 
actions with no allegation of actual harm to the plaintiff may 
lack constitutional standing per Supreme Court precedent. 
The data presented here, however, show that almost half 
(45%) of all filings and an even higher fraction of all class 
settlements (47%) under federal consumer protection 
statutes involve cases without allegations of harm to 
consumers. Even if such settlements were compensating 
consumers efficiently, they would be doing so where there 
may be little or no harm to compensate or to deter in the 
future. 
To measure the significance of no-allegation-of-injury (or 
“no-injury”) class actions in the Illinois Data, the research 
team identified the relevant cases, for example, by 
examining whether the plaintiff alleged and/or attempted to 
prove that he or she suffered injury. Under this criterion, 
three types of cases qualify: (1) EFTA ATM “on or at” notice 
failures; (2) FCRA expiration date and employment 
background check formalities cases; and (3) FDCPA cases 
alleging a failure to follow formalities. This leaves TCPA 
cases. 
In passing the TCPA, Congress found that unconsented 
autodialed communications cause at least some annoyance to 
the recipient and that lack of consent was crucial to 
consumer harm. All TCPA filings in the Illinois Data allege 
that autodialed calls were made to the plaintiff without 
consent. For this reason, TCPA cases are not categorized as 
no-injury cases. As discussed in more detail below, however, 
courts have shifted to TCPA defendants the burden of 
proving that the plaintiff did consent. Thus, TCPA plaintiffs 
merely must allege that they did not consent to the 
autodialed communication. Many TCPA cases may involve 
consent and no harm as Congress understood it. For this 
reason, this Article also considers the proportion of no-injury 
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filings and class settlements with TCPA filings removed 
from the sample. 
Consider first the numbers on no-injury filings, including 
TCPA cases. Of 327 total filings, a total of 148, or 45%, 
contain no allegation of plaintiff injury.150 Thus, even 
including all TCPA cases, no-injury cases comprise almost 
half of the cases in the Illinois Data. As for the class 
settlement outcome, the question is whether no-injury cases 
occur with a statistically significant higher probability 
among filings ending in class settlement than filings ending 
in other ways. No-injury cases make up 47% of the cases 
ending in class settlement (40 out of 85), and 49% of cases 
that do not end in a class settlement (118 out of 242). This 
difference is not statistically significant, and in any event, 
no-injury cases are more likely in the set of filings that do 
not end in class settlement than in those that do.151 
These numbers are derived under the assumption that all 
TCPA cases are properly included as cases involving an 
allegation of harm. After excluding TCPA filings, 216 filings 
remain, of which 158, or 73%, are cases with no allegation 
that the plaintiff suffered harm. In the sample with TCPA 
filings excluded, where 80% of the class settlements involved 
cases with no-injury allegations, only 72% (or 118 out of 164) 
of cases that did not end in class settlement were no-injury 
cases. Thus, with TCPA filings excluded, no-injury cases are 
 
150 There are 43 ATM no-harm filings, 44 FCRA expiration date or 
background check filings, and 71 FDCPA formality filings, for a total of 
148 no-harm filings; 148/327 = 45% no allegation of harm filings. 
151 In the full sample, with TCPA cases included as cases alleging 
harm, there are 327 total cases, with 158 (or 48%) involving no harm. Of 
the 242 cases not ending in class settlement, 118 (or 49% of the total) were 
cases were no-injury cases as categorized in the text. Of the 85 cases 
ending in class settlement, 40 (or 47% of this sample) involved no harm. 
With a z statistic of only .33, the difference between the .49 rate at which 
no-injury cases appear in the sample that does not end in a class 
settlement and the .47 rate at which they appear in the sample ending in 
class settlement is not statistically significant (we cannot reject the null of 
equal proportions). 
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significantly more likely to end in class settlement than 
other types of filings.152 
What is perhaps most striking about the Illinois Data is 
the high fraction of cases without any allegation of actual 
harm. Excluding TCPA cases, the data shows that no-harm 
class actions are significantly more likely to end in class 
settlement than otherwise. Some of these settlements seem 
clearly to involve payments to class counsel and consumers 
where no consumer has even suffered harm. Under the 
FCRA, it is now widely acknowledged that printing an 
expiration date on a credit-card receipt cannot compromise 
cardholder identity. Many believe that failure of an employer 
to comply with the various disclosures and other formalities 
required by the FCRA of employers who use employment 
background checks causes no harm to any employment 
applicant. The same is true for the most commonly occurring 
class settlement under the FDCPA, those involving a failure 
to follow various disclosure formalities—a failure that does 
not cause harm to any debtor. 
On the other hand, it may be argued that even if the 
FCRA expiration cases are conceded to involve no harm to 
consumers, failure to follow disclosure requirements under 
FRCA and the FDCPA may sometimes lead to harm. A 
consumer properly informed of a background report could 
discover and report errors and persuade a prospective 
employer to look past the report in making its hiring 
decision. If a consumer knows that a debt collector is 
attempting to communicate, he or she might be able to 
inform the debt collector quickly that the debt has actually 
been paid. 
While these are possibilities, the existing literature on 
disclosure indicates that they are very unlikely. There is 
little evidence that mandatory consumer disclosures are 
 
152 With the overall probability of a no-injury case in the non-TCPA 
sample at .72, and such cases occurring in the class-action settlement sub-
sample of size 52 with probability .8 and in the no class settlement sub-
sample of size 164 with probability .74, the z statistic equals 16, which is 
significant at the .0001 level. 
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effective in actually informing consumers.153 In light of this 
evidence, the expected harm to consumers from violation of 
disclosure and other formalities is likely low. On the basic 
economic model of optimal compensation, one is led to ask 
whether the harm being compensated is one that the 
consumer would insure against if offered such insurance at a 
price equal to the insurer’s expected payout plus a 
competitive profit (an actuarially fair rate).154 Because the 
cost of delivering compensation through class-action 
settlements is so high, a consumer would pay a relatively 
high price for such compensation. With such high costs, 
relative to very small coverage amounts, even a very risk 
averse consumer would turn down such insurance. 
Given the questionable utility of compensating consumers 
for such harms, the private enforcement incentives created 
by no-harm class actions become especially troublesome. 
Simply by allowing the consolidation and joint pursuit of 
thousands or millions of small claims, class actions 
incentivize private enforcement of violations generating such 
claims. The data show that statutes with statutory damages 
up to (in the case of the TCPA) $1500 per violation without 
even an allegation of harm to class members creates an 
extraordinarily powerful incentive for class counsel to pursue 
such cases. Moreover, as the data confirms, the extra 
incentive generated by statutory damages likely has its 
biggest marginal impact in cases where the class of 
consumers is relatively small. 
To see this, consider first a TCPA class action with one 
million class members, each of whom suffers on average $10 
of annoyance when bothered by an autodialed call to her 
cellphone. If recovery is limited to actual damages suffered, 
such a suit offers $10,000,000 of actual damage recovery. A 
 
153 See OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU 
WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 33–118 (2014) 
(giving a survey of the empirical literature indicating the ineffectiveness of 
consumer disclosure). 
154 See Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law ch. 5, at 4 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9694, 2003). 
JOHNSTON – FINAL  
No. 1:1] HIGH COST, LITTLE COMPENSATION 69 
class action with such an easy-to-prove violation of the law 
would likely be attractive to plaintiffs’ attorneys even 
without statutory damages that boost the potential recovery 
to $1.5 billion. 
By contrast, consider next an FDCPA case with only 1000 
class members suing for violation of statutory formalities 
that harmed each in the amount of $10. If recovery is limited 
to actual damages, such a class action would hold out the 
prospect of only $10,000 in aggregate damages. Such a case 
might interest relatively few plaintiffs’ attorneys. However, 
the same suit offering statutory damages of $1000 per class 
member would have a potential aggregate recovery of 
$1,000,000. With such potential liability, the class action 
would seemingly be much more attractive to class counsel. 
It may well be that Congress fully intended to use 
statutory damages with no allegation of harm to work such a 
massive boost of the private enforcement incentives of class 
counsel. However, a necessary consequence of such no-harm 
statutory damage claims is to divert the efforts of class 
counsel away from other case types where the harm to 
consumers may be larger but statutory damages smaller. 
Statutory damages are relatively uniform across all case 
types used this in Article; class members virtually always 
ask for roughly $1000 per class member. When statutory 
damages do not vary with the harm suffered by consumers, 
class counsel have no incentive to choose to pursue cases 
where the harm to deter is the greatest. Instead, their 
incentive is to pursue the cases that are easiest to establish, 
such as those where a credit card receipt contains the 
expiration date. One must wonder whether Congress 
intended this result. 
 
B. Attorneys’ Fees to Class Counsel that Often Exceed 
Total Class Compensation Suggest that Consumer 
Class Actions are a Highly Inefficient Method of 
Compensation 
In class settlements under the TCPA and FCRA 
expiration date cases—the largest class settlements—
attorneys’ fees equal or exceed, often by a multiple, the 
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aggregate class compensation. Indeed, of all TCPA and 
FCRA class settlements, only for FCRA employment 
background check settlements are attorneys’ fees 
significantly less (at 57%) than aggregate class 
compensation. For many commonly occurring class-action 
settlements—such as in FCRA expiration date cases and 
TCPA cases involving marketing faxes—attorneys’ fees 
range from four to nine times class compensation. 
Of course, the fees paid to class counsel are only one part 
of the total cost of achieving a class-action settlement. 
Defense counsel fees may be at least as high. Additionally, 
there is an opportunity cost to operating the court system to 
pursue class-action settlements rather than adjudicating 
other types of cases. Based on the Illinois Data, the total cost 
of achieving class-action settlements is typically equal to 
many times the total amount recovered by the class. Were 
these individual lawsuits instead of a class action, only a 
person motivated by spite and not by purely financial 
concerns would ever pursue a lawsuit that costs several 
times potential recovery. Nor could the plaintiffs find value 
in establishing a precedent to justify incurring such high 
fees, as class-action settlements establish no legal precedent. 
The only exception to the pattern of attorneys’ fees that 
may be several times as high as the class recovery is for 
settlements under the FDCPA. However, as Figure 10 
shows, attorneys’ fees in FDCPA class settlements are 
always at least two-thirds of the class recovery. For the most 
commonly occurring such settlement—involving a failure of 
FDCPA formalities—attorneys’ fees are on average equal to 
the class recovery. Even in FDCPA cases, viewed purely as 
an instrument for mass compensation, class-action 
settlements are enormously inefficient. 
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C. Data Showing that Only a Small Fraction of the 
Class Receives Compensation in the Largest Class-
Action Settlements Further Show the Inefficiency of 
the Consumer Class Action as an Instrument of 
Compensation 
This inefficiency would be true even if class-action 
settlements actually compensated most class members. But 
for only one type of class settlement—an FDCPA settlement 
involving a bad affidavit—were the majority of class 
members compensated. For all other case types, at most one-
third or one-half of the class was compensated. And for the 
largest class settlements—involving debt calls in violation of 
the TCPA, FCRA expiration date violations, and FDCPA 
formality violations—only 10% to 15% of class members ever 
receive even one dollar under a class-action settlement. 
Class-action settlements do generate some plaintiff 
compensation, but especially in the largest class actions, 
about 90% of class members receive nothing. 
 
D. As There Are No “Small Dollar” Consumer Class 
Actions Under Federal Consumer Protection 
Statutes with Statutory Damages, the Basic 
Economic Justification for Claims Aggregation in 
the Class Action May Fail to Hold 
As discussed in the introduction, the basic economic 
rationale for consumer class actions is that when individual 
consumer harm is small, even though efficient deterrence 
requires forcing firms to pay for the harm they have caused, 
no consumer will find it in her self-interest to pursue a 
lawsuit. By aggregating claims via the class-action device, 
class counsel has an incentive to bring suits that force firms 
to internalize the harm they have caused. Whether or not 
deterrence is optimal—in the sense of imposing liability 
equal to the actual harm caused if and only if the firm has 
actually caused harm—the class action at the very least 
forces firms to internalize some of the harm they cause. 
The federal consumer protection statutes discussed here 
award statutory damages of at least $500, and more often 
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$1000 or $1500, without proof of harm. In each of the 327 
cases in the Illinois Data, the plaintiff asked for at least 
statutory damages. Thus, there are no truly small dollar 
claims under the federal consumer protection statutes 
studied here. The Illinois Data is insufficient to demonstrate 
whether or not $1000 in statutory damages incentivizes an 
individual lawsuit. However, the Illinois Data does provide 
evidence that federal consumer protection statutes have 
eliminated the very small $20 or $30 claim that is often 
taken to epitomize and justify consumer class actions. 
 
E. Consumer Class Actions Under Federal Consumer 
Protection Statutes Are Never Tried, Rarely 
Generate Binding Legal Precedent, and May Well 
Be Individually Viable 
The data also shows that the value of consumer class 
actions in setting binding legal precedent that may guide 
future behavior may be more limited than some 
commentators assume. Some published opinions do emerge 
from the kind of class-action litigations studied here. Courts 
have, for example, clarified in published opinions that the 
defendant in a TCPA case has the burden of showing that 
the consumer consented to be called.155 But while courts do 
issue opinions when they rule on motions to dismiss and 
summary judgment motions, very few such opinions are 
published. Nonetheless, precisely zero cases in the sample of 
327 consumer class actions ever went to trial. The rare 
plaintiff judgments were all default judgments. The data 
suggest that consumer class actions under federal consumer 
protection statutes rarely involve a formal vindication of 
consumer rights. 
Most of the time, consumer class actions generate an 
individual settlement. About half of the TCPA, FCRA, and 
EFTA cases in the Illinois Data settled individually. A full 
70% of all FDCPA cases ended in an individual settlement. 
 
155 See cases cited infra note 163. 
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Somewhat ironically, consumer class actions under these 
statutes seem to do quite well at compensating the 
individual named plaintiff. The terms of the individual 
settlements are opaque. However, in the three default 
judgments in our sample, the plaintiffs were awarded 
maximum statutory damages of $1000, with attorneys’ fees 
of roughly $10,000 also awarded. If the terms of these 
default judgments were similar to the terms of individual 
settlements, then at the very least, class counsel are being 
fully compensated for their efforts in obtaining such 
individual settlements. It may well be that without the 
threat of proceeding to discovery in an attempt to certify the 
class, such individual settlements would not occur. However, 
the ubiquity of such settlements strongly suggests that the 
fees awarded for obtaining individual settlements are 
sufficient to incentivize class counsel in these types of federal 
consumer protection cases. This suggests that consumer 
class actions under these statutes may not be vital to either 
compensation or deterrence. 
 
F. Even Cases With Allegations of Harm May Actually 
Involve No Harm to Anybody 
Other types of class settlements in the Illinois Data do 
involve behavior that Congress deemed harmful. The 
FDCPA is premised on the finding that when debt collectors 
attempt to collect on bad debts and threaten debtors with 
groundless litigation, they cause harm to debtors. Some 
FDCPA class actions allege such harmful behavior. The 
TCPA is premised on the Congressional finding that 
consumers are harmed when they are bothered by receiving 
an automatic phone call, voicemail, text, email, or fax that 
they never consented to receive.  
Observe, however, that the harm from such practices 
depends upon individually specific circumstances. Debt 
collectors are not prohibited from attempting to collect valid 
debts that are not time barred, and debt owners and 
collectors are legally permitted to and do bring lawsuits to 
collect on such debts. Consumers do consent to some 
autodialed calls, as when an insured gives her phone number 
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to her insurance company so as to be alerted to changes in 
her health insurance plan, or a patient gives her phone 
number to her dentist so as to be alerted that it is time for 
her teeth to be cleaned by a hygienist. Thus, the question for 
class-action settlements is whether settlements occur when 
they should—when the individual circumstances are such 
that the harm Congress cared about actually occurred, so 
that settlements may serve a valuable deterrent function—or 
instead are random, meaning that they are as likely to occur 
when there is no harm as when there is harm. 
Cases in the Illinois Data provide reason for concern on 
this score. Consider the TCPA class settlements. Over the 
period 2010–2012, TCPA class settlements generated $188 
million in aggregate payouts. Were one to extrapolate from 
the total payout in TCPA class settlements in our sample to 
the broader national level, if there are even ten district 
courts with the volume of consumer class actions as the 
Northern District, then nationally there would have been at 
least $1.9 billion in TCPA payouts over just a three-year 
period. This is not a trivial aggregate amount. 
The non-trivial payouts in TCPA cases may well be 
justified on deterrence grounds because, unlike the FCRA 
expiration date cases and FDCPA and FCRA cases alleging a 
failure to comply with formalities, a typical TCPA class-
action filing alleges the defendant engaged in conduct that 
Congress specifically found to be harmful to consumers. As 
the Ninth Circuit explained in Satterfield v. Simon & 
Shuster, Congress passed the TCPA “in response to an 
increasing number of consumer complaints arising from the 
increased number of telemarketing calls.”156 Consumers 
“complained that such calls are a ‘nuisance and an invasion 
of privacy.’”157 The TCPA’s goal was to “protect the privacy 
interests of residential telephone subscribers by placing 
restrictions on unsolicited, automated telephone calls to the 
home and to facilitate inter-state commerce by restricting 
 
156 Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
157 Id.  
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certain uses of facsimile machines and automatic dialers.”158 
With the obvious difficulty of precisely valuing the cost of 
such privacy invasions, the TCPA’s $500 statutory damage 
provision—rising to $1500 for willful violations—can be 
justified as a way to deter privacy invasions without getting 
bogged down in a likely fruitless attempt to precisely value 
the harm they cause. 
As the harm caused by an autodialed cellphone call or 
text—namely, an invasion of privacy and annoyance—itself 
depends on the communication being unwanted by the 
consumer, the TCPA allows autodialed calls that are made 
with the “express consent” of the “called party” and also 
allows fax advertisements from senders with an “established 
business relationship” to recipients who have “voluntarily” 
communicated or made available to the sender their fax 
number.159 Thus, the TCPA explicitly recognizes that 
sometimes consumers may actually want to receive certain 
autodialed calls or fax advertisements. In these cases, there 
is, almost tautologically, no harm to the consumer in 
receiving something that she has explicitly authorized (in 
the case of calls) or might well expect (in the case of faxes). 
Inasmuch as the harm from a TCPA violation depends 
upon whether a particular consumer consented to the 
communication or had an ongoing business relationship with 
the defendant, one might argue that a class action is not an 
appropriate way to adjudicate alleged TCPA violations. 
 
158 Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1 (1991), as reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 1968.). 
159 More specifically, §§ 227(b)(1)(A) and (B) allow autodialed phone 
calls made with “express consent” from the recipient, and § 227(b)(1)(C) 
permits unsolicited fax advertisements from:  
a sender with an established business relationship with the recipient” 
where “(ii) the sender obtained the number of the telephone facsimile 
machine through—(I) the voluntary communication of such number, 
within the context of such established business relationship, from the 
recipient of the unsolicited advertisement, or (II) a directory, 
advertisement, or site on the Internet to which the recipient voluntarily 
agreed to make available its facsimile number for public distribution.  
47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (2012). 
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Under FRCP 23(b), a court is to certify a class action seeking 
individual damages only if it finds that “questions of law or 
fact common to class members predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members.”160 However, 
whether the plaintiff in a TCPA action expressly consented 
to be called involves an individualized, fact-specific inquiry, 
making class certification for such actions inappropriate 
under FRCP 23. Three cases in the Illinois Data contain 
evidence that the defendant made this argument.161 In one 
case, class counsel overcame this argument simply by 
defining the class to be all those consumers who received the 
allegedly unlawful communication without consent. 
However, in a thoughtful opinion, Judge Kendall found that 
decisions from around the country on this issue had 
generated a rule that “when a defendant sets forth specific 
evidence showing that a significant percentage of the 
putative class consented to receiving calls on their 
cellphone,” the issues of individualized consent 
predominated, making class certification inappropriate.162 
The Illinois Data shows that the vast majority of TCPA class 
actions may survive without serious inquiry into the 
predominance of class issues. 
Defendants also once made the argument that a plaintiff 
alleging a violation of the TCPA must also prove that he or 
she did not consent to receiving the cellphone call or fax (the 
 
160 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)  
161 Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Class Certification of Count VIII of 
the Consolidated Complaint, Balbarin v. N. Star Capital Acquisition LLC, 
No. 10-cv-1846 (N.D. Ill. 2012), ECF No. 144; Response by First Credit 
Services, Inc. in Opposition to Motion by Plaintiff Kofi Jamison to Certify 
Class, Jamison v. First Credit Servs., No. 12-cv-4415 (N.D. Ill. 2012), ECF 
No. 79; Defendant’s Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiff’s 
Counterclaim, Hanley v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 12-cv-1612 (N.D. Ill. 2012), 
ECF No. 18. 
162 Jamison v. First Credit Servs., Inc., 290 F.R.D. 92, 107 (N.D. Ill. 
2013) (finding class certification inappropriate where Honda showed that 
1200 out of 2887 class members had provided their phone numbers and 
where individualized inquiry into Honda’s records would be required to 
determine whether the remaining class members had consented). 
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latter by having an existing business relationship). Judicial 
interpretations of the TCPA have said to the contrary that 
“prior express consent” under the TCPA is an affirmative 
defense on which the defendant bears the burden of proof; it 
is not a required element of the plaintiff’s claim.163 The 
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), which 
administers the implementation of the TCPA, has agreed 
that the defendant has the burden of establishing that the 
plaintiff “expressly consented” to the communication.164 
Filings in the Illinois Data show that defendants do 
sometimes succeed in carrying this burden. Indeed, of the six 
TCPA cases that defendants won, only two were won on 
substantive grounds. However, in both of these cases, the 
defendant established the affirmative defense of prior 
express consent by showing that the plaintiff had provided 
her phone number as part of an ongoing business 
relationship, knowing that it would be used by defendant or 
others to contact him or her.165  
 
163 See Thrasher-Lyon v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 861 F. Supp. 2d 898, 
905 (N.D. Ill. 2012); D.G. v. Diversified Adjustment Serv., Inc., No. 11-cv-
2062, 2011 WL 5506078, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2011); Martin v. Bureau 
of Collection Recovery, No. 10-cv-7725, 2011 WL 2311869 at *1 (N.D. Ill. 
June 13, 2011); see also Grant v. Capital Mgmt. Servs., L.P., 449 F. App’x 
598, 600 n.1 (9th Cir. 2011); Pinkard v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-
2902, 2012 WL 5511039, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 9, 2012). 
164 Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 
1991, 23 F.C.C. 559, 565 (2008) (“Should a question arise as to whether 
express consent was provided, the burden will be on the creditor to show it 
obtained the necessary prior express consent.”). 
165 In Elkins v. Medco Health Solutions, Inc., the court found that the 
plaintiff expressly consented to receive telephone calls from her health 
plan’s pharmacy benefits manager advising her of cheaper prescription 
renewal options when she provided her phone number while enrolling in a 
health plan agreement that stated that the plan provider may use or share 
the information provided by the subscriber for “other businesses who work 
for the Plan . . . [t]o tell You about treatment options or health related 
services.” No. 12-cv-5617 (N.D. Ill. 2012), transferred & decided on 
summary judgment No. 4:12-cv-2141, 2014 WL 1663406, at *3 (E.D. Mo. 
Apr. 25, 2014). In Greene v. Direct TV, the court found that when she 
provided her cellphone number to Equifax knowing that potential 
creditors would use it as a contact number for potential fraud alert 
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These decisions were consistent with most earlier judicial 
decisions and FCC regulations as they existed at the time.166 
Both had said that by proving that a consumer gave his or 
her number to a business with whom he or she had an 
existing business relationship, a TCPA defendant 
established express consent. The burden then shifts to the 
consumer to show that she had revoked that consent by 
requesting no further calls.167 
Following some district courts (including one decision in 
the Illinois Data),168 the FCC has recently promulgated a 
rule under which TCPA defendants may no longer establish 
express consent to an autodialed call or fax by showing that 
the plaintiff provided her cellphone number under an 
established business relationship. Under a rule that took 
 
notifications, the plaintiff provided express consent for the defendant to 
use that number to contact her to verify her identity. No. 10-cv-117 (N.D. 
Ill. Nov. 8, 2010). 
166 See, e.g., Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 23 F.C.C.R. 559, 564 (2008) (concluding 
that giving a “cell phone number to a creditor, e.g., as part of a credit 
application, reasonably evidences prior express consent by the cell phone 
subscriber to be contacted at that number regarding the debt”). 
167 According to a decades-old FCC rule, “persons who knowingly 
release their phone numbers have in effect given their invitation or 
permission to be called at the number which they have given, absent 
instructions to the contrary. Hence, telemarketers will not violate our 
rules by calling a number which was provided as one at which the called 
party wishes to be reached.” In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the 
Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 7 FCC Rcd. at 8769; see also id. at 8779 
n.47 (“[S]ubscribers may sever any business relationship, i.e., revoke 
consent to any future solicitations, by requesting that they not receive 
further calls from a telemarketer, . . .”); Elkins v. Medco Health Solutions, 
Inc., No. 12-cv-5617 (N.D. Ill. 2012), transferred & decided on summary 
judgment No. 4:12-cv-2141, 2014 WL 1663406, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 25, 
2014). 
168 Edeh v. Midland Credit Mgmt. Inc., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1038 (D. 
Minn. 2010); Thrasher-Lyon v. Illinois Farmers Commercial Ins. Co., 861 
F. Supp. 2d 898, 907 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (holding that while providing a phone 
number to a creditor may establish consent for auto-dialed calls from the 
creditor, this does not establish express consent to receive such calls from 
a debt collection company acting as an agent of the creditor). 
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effect on October 16, 2013, TCPA defendants in 
telemarketing cases must produce a “prior written consent,” 
where:  
[t]he term prior express written consent means an 
agreement, in writing, bearing the signature of the 
person called that clearly authorizes the seller to 
deliver or cause to be delivered to the person called 
advertisements or telemarketing messages using an 
automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or 
prerecorded voice, and the telephone number to 
which the signatory authorizes such advertisements 
or telemarketing messages to be delivered.169 Such 
written agreement must include a “clear and 
conspicuous disclosure” that informs consumers that 
they are not required to sign the agreement as a 
condition to receiving any good or service but that by 
signing they consent to receiving telemarketing 
calls.170 
A final commonly occurring problem with the consent 
defense to a TCPA robocall violation arises when the 
defendant was provided the cellphone number by a customer 
but that customer no longer owns the number. Cellphone 
number reassignments occur with perhaps surprising 
frequency, totaling (according to one journalistic account) 
about thirty-seven million in 2011.171 Several plaintiffs in the 
TCPA cases in the Illinois Data were called on cellphone 
numbers that had been given to defendants not by the 
plaintiffs but by previous holders of that number.172 In such 
cases, defendants argued that they had “consent” under the 
TCPA to make such calls. Plaintiffs argued that when 
Congress allowed robocalls made with the prior express 
 
169 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(8) (2012). 
170 §§ 64.1200(f)(8)(i)(A), (B). 
171 Alyssa Abkowitz, Wrong Number? Blame Companies’ Recycling, 
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB10001424052970204012004577070122687462582. 
172 See, e.g., Soppet v. Enhanced Recovery Co., No. 10-cv-5469, 2011 
WL 3704681, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2011).  
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consent of the “called party” in the TCPA,173 it meant the 
party actually called. Plaintiffs also argued that Congress 
did not create an implicit exception for calls inadvertently 
made to people who had never actually consented. Thus far, 
the federal courts of appeals have sided with the plaintiffs, 
uniformly holding that when Congress said that the “called 
party” needs to have consented, it meant the current phone 
subscriber.174 
Such decisions may seem relatively straightforward as a 
matter of statutory interpretation, but they raise deeper 
issues regarding the normative desirability of TCPA liability. 
Prominent commentators175 have argued that by threatening 
companies with the kind of multi-million-dollar class-action 
settlements found in the Illinois Data, TCPA liability for 
robocalls inadvertently made to the wrong person will chill 
valuable communications, such as calls sending fraud and 
identify theft alerts and reminders of appointment and due 
dates. Other commentators have found it “amazing” that 
TCPA liability in this situation is even a “topic of debate,” 
reflecting the current “zeitgeist” in which the potential for 
liability to increase firm costs and prices itself counts as an 
argument against liability.176 Still, the inadvertent wrong 
number TCPA debt collection calls are yet another indication 
of the questionable utility on deterrence grounds of many 





173 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2012). 
174 See Osorio v. State Farm Bank, 746 F.3d 1242, 1251 (11th Cir. 
2014); Soppet v. Enhanced Recovery Co., 679 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 2012). 
175 See Adonis Hoffman, Sorry, Wrong Number, Now Pay Up, WALL 
ST. J., (June 15, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sorry-wrong-number-
now-pay-up-1434409610?KEYWORDS=sorry+wrong+number. 
176 Lincoln Caplan, Paying for Robo-Calls, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2012), 
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/18/paying-for-robo-calls 
[https://perma.cc/CCD7-9NEP]. 
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IV. IMPROVING CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS 
UNDER FEDERAL CONSUMER PROTECTION 
STATUTES 
A. The Impact of Spokeo in Screening No-Harm Cases 
As discussed in the Introduction, Spokeo v. Robins was a 
class action seeking statutory damages of $100 to $1000 
under the FCRA against a “people search engine” website 
that allegedly misstated information about the plaintiff’s 
age, marital status, education, and professional 
experience.177 As described earlier, FCRA permits statutory 
damages without requiring proof of harm for the publication 
of a false report.178 The Supreme Court allowed the Spokeo 
case to proceed but held that the Ninth Circuit confused the 
particularity requirement for standing with the requirement 
that the plaintiff show that “the particular [FCRA] 
procedural violations entail a degree of risk sufficient to 
meet the concreteness requirement.”179 While providing little 
guidance as to the sufficient degree of risk, the Court’s 
decision in Spokeo nonetheless provides an avenue for courts 
to screen out consumer class actions where there truly is no 
harm or risk of harm. 
The most glaring no-harm cases in our sample are those 
involving the printing of an expiration date on a receipt in 
violation of FCRA, the violation of various formalities in 
employment background checks under the FCRA, and 
various communications by debt collectors for which a 
violation of the FDCPA is alleged. In the expiration date 
cases, the existing evidence is that there is neither harm nor 
risk of harm. Under Spokeo, a plaintiff’s inability to produce 
an affidavit testifying that the printing of an expiration date 
could cause harm could quickly end such cases at the 
standing stage. As such cases are not insignificant in the 
sample studied above, that alone would be a salutary impact 
 
177 See supra text accompanying note 14. 
178 See the discussion of FCRA supra Section II.C.1. 
179 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1543 (2016). 
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from Spokeo. As for the cases involving violations of various 
formalities, it would be of great interest to see whether 
plaintiffs could produce affidavits testifying even to a risk of 
harm to the consumer. If they could consistently do so, then 
it would be surprising in light of the mass of empirical 
evidence showing the general ineffectiveness of disclosure 
formalities in particular. Still, if plaintiffs could produce 
such evidence, then these cases would proceed as they do 
now. If, however, such affidavits could not consistently be 
produced, then Spokeo would have been of social value in 
screening out true no-harm cases from the expensive class-
action process. 
 
B. Better Judicial Monitoring 
How, one might ask, could the current class-action system 
have evolved to become one in which the amount paid in 
attorneys’ fees is often equal to or greater than the amount of 
compensation actually received by class members and in 
which very few class members receive anything? By 
hypothesis and by fact, class actions involving numerous 
plaintiffs with small injuries do not have an actual plaintiff 
group who will monitor class counsel. Judges are supposed to 
monitor class actions, ensuring that a class action is legally 
justified and that any settlement in a class action actually 
promotes the interests of the absent class members. The 
idealized judicial role is described by Hensler: 
Judges play a unique role in damage class actions: 
Without the judge’s decision to grant certification, a 
class action lawsuit does not exist. Without the 
judge’s approval, a lawsuit cannot be settled. 
Without a judge’s decision to award fees, the class 
action attorneys cannot be paid. . . . Even after a case 
is resolved, judges may continue to play a role by 
overseeing the disbursement of settlement funds.180 
 
180 HENSLER ET AL., supra note 59, at 445. 
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However, a very basic economic model of judicial preferences 
suggests that judges may have little incentive to conform to 
this ideal. Judges likely value not only leisure but also 
prestige—their standing with other judges and the public at 
large.181 Assuming that prestige declines both when a trial 
judge is reversed on appeal and when court queues grow too 
long (partly because of the direct implication that the judge 
is lazy in failing to resolve cases, and partly because long 
queues lead to public pressure to increase the number of 
judges, which lowers the prestige of being a judge), trial 
judges will be attracted to case resolution methods that keep 
queues from getting too long but also minimize the chance of 
a potentially embarrassing reversal. Approving class-action 
settlements is an ideal method of case resolution from this 
judicial point of view: dockets are cleared with a very low 
probability of reversal. 
As part of approving such class-action settlements, judges 
also approve fees to the plaintiffs’ attorneys. While trial 
judges may be reversed on appeal for failing to certify a 
class, they are rarely, if ever, reversed for approving a 
settlement and its attendant attorneys’ fees award.182 Thus 
what Helland and Klick call “judicial expediency” predicts 
that judges would routinely approve class-action settlements 
with relatively large attorneys’ fees but little actual 
compensation to class members. 
The rough data is consistent with this judicial expediency 
story; as Eisenberg and Miller’s update to include cases from 
2003 to 2008 found, judges granted the requested attorneys’ 
fees in 70% of cases.183 More careful statistical analysis also 
has tended to confirm the judicial expediency hypothesis. 
Working with the Eisenberg and Miller dataset, Helland and 
Klick added to the list of explanatory variables a measure of 
 
181 Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, The Effect of Judicial Expedience 
on Attorney Fees in Class Actions, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 171, 172–73 (2007). 
182 See id. at 175–76. 
183 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and 
Expenses in Class Action Settlements: 1993–2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 248, 250 (2010). 
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court congestion (annual case terminations by judge) and 
found a significant relationship between court congestion 
and attorneys’ fees, with the fee increasing by .15% for every 
1% increase in terminations.184 
Whatever may be the explanation, judges are not 
monitoring class-action settlements in a way that ensures 
that compensation is actually paid to class members and 
that attorneys’ fees bear a reasonable relationship to the 
amount actually received by class members. A simple way to 
improve the performance of consumer class-action 
settlements would be for federal trial judges to wait to 
approve attorney fee awards until class counsel submit an 
accounting showing the actual compensation rate and the 
aggregate amount paid to the class and then base attorneys’ 
fees on both the aggregate payout and the compensation 
rate. Rather than basing attorneys’ fees on the customary 
range of attorneys’ fees to nominal settlement for a 
particular case type (i.e. TCPA debt call), district judges 
would award attorneys’ fees that increase with the 
compensation rate and the aggregate compensation. 
Attorneys would receive, for example, 33% of the nominal 
settlement only if aggregate compensation paid equaled the 
full amount called for under the terms of the nominal 
settlement. For typical class settlements, attorneys’ fees 
would be lower, representing the aggregate compensation 
actually paid to the class. The goal would be to ensure not 
only that the cost of generating the common fund recovery is 
less than the fund, but also to ensure that the bigger the 
fraction actually paid to class members, the bigger the class 
counsel’s compensation. 
The justification for such a relationship between 
attorneys’ fees and the actual aggregate class recovery lies in 
the basic economic idea that if a class action were instead an 
individual suit, then no rational plaintiff would agree to pay 
fees exceeding his or her own recovery. But such a plaintiff 
would agree to pay counsel more, the greater his or her own 
 
184 Helland & Klick, supra note 181, at 181. 
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recovery is. This arrangement describes how contingency 
fees work in individual personal injury actions. The class 
action is essentially a substitute, employed in cases where 
individual damages are too small for the typical contingency 
fee to create adequate incentives for lawsuits. But the 
individual contingency fee would provide the model for class-
action fees. 
Some may object that the class action is more than a 
substitute for an individual action; that class actions 
generate external benefits; that individual actions do not; 
and that relative to all benefits, attorneys’ fees are not 
disproportionate. The Illinois Data does not generally 
support these arguments. In terms of contributing to the 
stock of legal capital, consumer class actions under federal 
consumer protection statutes generate few legal precedents 
that guide future behavior and are never tried on the merits. 
As far as future deterrent value goes, as argued above, 
relatively uniform statutory damage provisions that do not 
require allegations or proof of harm make class counsel 
indifferent to the amount of actual harm suffered by the 
class. Cases that do involve actual individual harm, such as 
attempts by debt collectors to collect on bad debts that are 
not legally collectible, usually end in individual settlements 
that provide no external benefits. 
 
C. Congressional Action to Repeal Some Statutory 
Damage, No-Harm Causes of Action 
On grounds of both deterrence and compensation, the 
least justifiable class actions in the Illinois Data are those 
where the behavior, while it may violate the statute, causes 
no harm, such as FCRA expiration date cases. Congress 
acted in 2012 to repeal one such provision: the EFTA 
provision requiring a notice of ATM fees “on or at” the 
machine.185 Likewise, Congress could repeal similar 
provisions, such as the FCRA expiration date prohibition. 
 
185 See discussion supra Section II.B. 
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Somewhat more broadly, Congress should act to repeal or 
limit many of the statutory formalities whose violation so 
often provides the basis for a class-action settlement. The 
most ubiquitous such formality is a disclosure requirement. 
Cases alleging violation of a statutory disclosure 
requirement generate a large number of class-action 
settlements under both the FCRA and the FDCPA. As there 
is substantial evidence that such disclosure requirements 
fail to inform consumers,186 their violation arguably causes 
no harm to consumers. Since small and medium sized firms 
are most likely to be without the continuing legal advice that 
would allow them to avoid formality violations, they are most 
likely to violate these statutes. Eliminating the statutes 
would ease one of the burdens on such businesses, which are 




186 See BEN-SHAHAR, supra note 153, at 4. 
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APPENDIX 2. CLASS-ACTION SEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
In identifying consumer class actions filed in the 
Northern District of Illinois between 2010 and 2012, we used 
Bloomberg Law’s Docket Search of the PACER federal courts 
filing database, limiting the search to the U.S. District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois and selecting a date 
range between January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2012. 
Several keyword and string searches were then run to 
identify consumer class-action filings. 
First, we used the search strings “‘class action’ OR 
similarly /s situated,” and the somewhat broader term 
“class.” This search returned most of our cases, although 
some complaints had to be manually excluded since the 
search was too broad. We excluded all class-action 
complaints brought by a corporation rather than a consumer, 
shareholder derivative actions, complaints brought under the 
Securities & Exchange Act or the Commodities Futures 
Trading Act, employment-related class actions, and claims 
under the Civil Rights Act (though almost every one of these 
complaints was an employment-related class action anyway). 
We also excluded complaints that were brought on behalf of 
the named plaintiff and others “similarly situated,” but 
where the complaint was not seeking class certification and 
did not describe class damages. This happened most often in 
mass tort or products liability cases where a number of 
plaintiffs were joined to the action but the case was not 
proceeding as a class action. 
We also ran a keyword search within the database 
described in the first paragraph; the search term was “class 
action,” and “Consumer Credit” was selected as the “Nature 
of Suit.” This added many results that did not appear when 
we searched for just “class action” complaints. 
This search was too narrow for class actions filed under 
federal consumer protection statutes, as it failed to pick up 
actions filed by businesses—such as the TCPA filings 
brought by doctors’ and dentists’ offices who received junk 
faxes—and employment background check class actions 
under the FCRA. Both types are, under the relevant 
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statutes, consumer class actions. Hence, we ran searches 
using statutes as the search term, for example, “FCRA” and 
“Fair Credit Reporting Act.” This method brought up every 
filing under such statutes, and we manually identified which 
of these filings were class actions. 
Our methodology was similar to that employed by the 
CFPB in gathering data on class actions for its 2015 
Arbitration Study in that we searched electronically 
available docket sheets. Our methodology differed from the 
CFPB’s in other respects. The CFPB searched a slightly 
different source of docket sheet information, LexisNexis’s 
Courtlink database, and its automated search used as search 
strings the six product categories it had defined as the 
subject of its study.187 For example, the CFPB searched for 
complaints with terms “credit card’ or ‘credit cards’ or ‘charge 
card’ or ‘charge cards.’” Thus, the primary difference between 
this study and the CFPB’s is that this is interested in finding 
all consumer class actions filed during our study period, 
regardless of whether they involved a financial product or 
service, whereas the CFPB’s was interested in finding all 
filings involving one of the financial product and service 
categories it was studying. Within its product-centered 
database, the CFPB then seems to have proceeded, as did 
we, to manually inspect the docket sheet entries, identifying 
the dispute type from the complaint, and the outcome and 
other variables of interest from the docket sheet entries. In 
identifying the existence and terms of a class settlement,188 
the CFPB looked at some of the same docket-available 
sources we considered—settlement agreements, final or 
preliminary approval orders—but apparently did not look 
carefully at the memoranda in support of preliminary and 
final approval or class settlements. On the other hand, the 
CFPB sometimes apparently interviewed settlement 
 
187 See Appendix L: Section 6, in 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 
21. 
188 See Appendix S: Section 8, in 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 
21. 
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administrators to get further settlement details, something 
that we did not do. 
